Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Part I Kingdom and Colony: The Mythology of Race (Pre-history to 1948)
- Part II Dominion to Republic: The Politics of Language (1948–1977)
- Part III The New Monarch: Jayewardene in Control (1977–1983)
- Part IV The New Dominion: India in the Driving Seat (1983–1987)
- Chapter 6 The Bang and the Whimpers
- Chapter 7 Raising the Stakes
- Chapter 8 Holding the Centre
- Part V Changing the Guard: Premadasa's Emergence (1987–1989)
- Part VI Using the Executive Presidency: Premadasa in Action (1989–1993)
- Part VII Using the Spoon: Wijetunge as President (1993–1994)
- Part VIII The Procrastination of a Princess: Kumaratunga in charge (1994–2001)
- Part IX The Baby without the Bathwater: Wickremesinghe as Prime Minister (2001–2004)
- Part X Guarding the Change: Rajapakse's Emergence (2004–2006)
- Select Bibliography
- Index
Chapter 8 - Holding the Centre
from Part IV - The New Dominion: India in the Driving Seat (1983–1987)
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 November 2011
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Part I Kingdom and Colony: The Mythology of Race (Pre-history to 1948)
- Part II Dominion to Republic: The Politics of Language (1948–1977)
- Part III The New Monarch: Jayewardene in Control (1977–1983)
- Part IV The New Dominion: India in the Driving Seat (1983–1987)
- Chapter 6 The Bang and the Whimpers
- Chapter 7 Raising the Stakes
- Chapter 8 Holding the Centre
- Part V Changing the Guard: Premadasa's Emergence (1987–1989)
- Part VI Using the Executive Presidency: Premadasa in Action (1989–1993)
- Part VII Using the Spoon: Wijetunge as President (1993–1994)
- Part VIII The Procrastination of a Princess: Kumaratunga in charge (1994–2001)
- Part IX The Baby without the Bathwater: Wickremesinghe as Prime Minister (2001–2004)
- Part X Guarding the Change: Rajapakse's Emergence (2004–2006)
- Select Bibliography
- Index
Summary
The failure of negotiations
The negotiations in Bhutan gradually collapsed, as violations of the ceasefire by terrorists on the ground were met with corresponding violence from the Sri Lankan army. As violence escalated, so did the acrimoniousness of the remonstrations on either side.
The Sri Lankan government was perhaps encouraged in its uncompromising attitude by the perception that Rajiv Gandhi was displeased with the intransigence of the terrorists. Even when they withdrew from the talks, the ceasefire was not renounced, and the impression was that the Indian government was keeping the groups in line and would help to produce a solution. The pot of gold at the end of the rainbow was to emerge after discussions between Jayawardene and Gandhi at the SAARC meeting for heads of government to be held in Dhaka in early December.
In accordance with this the government produced a draft paper that represented a distinct advance on what had been proposed before. Though the unit of devolution was still to be District Councils, provision was made for the amalgamation of these into Provincial Councils. However,the union of the Northern and Eastern Provinces was ruled out, while the Provincial Councils were allowed more limited powers than were likely to be accepted.
It was not surprising that by the beginning of December the pot of gold had begun to look more distant. While the TULF put forward alternative proposals, the most powerful Tamil group at the negotiations, made up of four terrorist organizations, rejected the government's proposals and refused to put forward any of its own.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Declining Sri LankaTerrorism and Ethnic Conlict, the Legacy of J. R. Jayewardene, pp. 99 - 116Publisher: Foundation BooksPrint publication year: 2007