This book is about the power to declare war: who should possess the authority, how they should exercise it, what purposes a declaration serves, and why. This book is, consequently, about the relationships among conflict resolution, speech acts, and the rule of law. This consequence follows from the fact that declarations of war are speech acts. They are public “announcements” of official decisions. As public “announcements,” they can be motivated by either one of two antithetical attitudes: One can declare war as an act of anger and vengeance seeking “victory” over one’s enemy, or one can declare war as the initial step in resolving a serious conflict with one’s conflict partner. In the former case, conflict resolution is irrelevant. A desire for “victory” over one’s enemy turns both speech and the rule of law into obstructions and hindrances. Why would anyone want to speak to the enemy? What could one possibly have to say to an enemy? Since the object is to destroy the enemy, why would anyone submit to the constraints of law? “Bomb them back to the Stone Age,” as General Curtis LaMay used to say. In the latter case, “victory” is irrelevant. A desire for resolution with one’s conflict partner turns both speech and the rule of law into aides and facilitators. Speech facilitates negotiations of the grievances and remedies, and law aids in reducing the necessities of war by restraining intemperate actions.