When we turn our attention to the Philippines, the pattern of money politics appears superficially to mirror that in Korea: weak parties devolve into personal vote machines that trade pork for payoffs. In both countries, political payoffs allow business influence over policy decisions. In both the Philippines and Korea, access to the state was the avenue to economic success. Yet there was a major difference between the two countries as well. In the Philippines no balance existed between economic and political elites – no mutual hostages existed. The overarching point of this chapter is that the pattern of influence in the Philippines reflects significant bandwagoning, as political and economic elites surged toward power like iron filings toward a magnet. During the democratic period, society held sway and plundered the state. Under martial law, the balance of power shifted to a coherent state elite led by Ferdinand Marcos. Yet the more autonomous and centralized Marcos regime did not have the same incentives and constraints that Park's regime did in Korea and turned to plundering society. The Philippine bureaucracy, although made more autonomous from social pressure, was not insulated from regime interests. Thus, the Philippines lurched back and forth as different groups gained and lost power.

The story of the Philippine political economy approximates much more closely the standard rent-seeking models.