Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Groundwork: Some distinctions
- 2 Moral obligation: An analysis
- 3 The dynamics of obligation
- 4 Conditional obligation
- 5 Prima facie obligation
- 6 Actualism and possibilism
- 7 Dilemmas
- 8 Supererogation
- 9 Cooperation
- Postscript
- Appendix: List of propositions
- List of works cited
- Index of names
- Index of subjects
9 - Cooperation
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 February 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Groundwork: Some distinctions
- 2 Moral obligation: An analysis
- 3 The dynamics of obligation
- 4 Conditional obligation
- 5 Prima facie obligation
- 6 Actualism and possibilism
- 7 Dilemmas
- 8 Supererogation
- 9 Cooperation
- Postscript
- Appendix: List of propositions
- List of works cited
- Index of names
- Index of subjects
Summary
You and I never act in isolation. Like it or not, we are all members of groups. Groups can achieve things that individuals alone cannot. This is an obvious fact that has so far been neglected in this book, but it is a fact that poses a serious problem for the account of obligation that I have proposed.
THE PROBLEM
The account that I have proposed is presented in Chapter 2. Its main claim is captured in (I). For the time being, let us work with the following simpler paraphrase of (I):
(9.1) for any person S and times T and T′, S ought at T to do at T′ the best that he can at T do at T′.
The problem that besets this account may be illustrated as follows. Suppose that there are two voters, Vincent and Virgil, and two candidates for election, Smith and Jones, and suppose that the voters' options may be ranked according to the matrix given in Chart 9.1. That is, it would be (deontically) best if both Vincent and Virgil voted for Smith; next best if one voted for Smith and the other abstained; next best if both voted for Jones; next best if one voted for Jones and the other abstained; and worst if either both abstained or one voted for Smith and the other for Jones. The question is: given (9.1), what should Vincent and Virgil do?
Before we attempt to answer this question, we should make note of what the illustration presupposes.
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- Information
- The Concept of Moral Obligation , pp. 254 - 276Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1996