We have seen in the preceding chapter that the claim for pensions and allowances is nearly double that for devastation, so that its inclusion in the Allies' demands nearly trebles the bill. It makes the difference between a demand which can be met and a demand which cannot be met. Therefore it is important.

In The Economic Consequences of the Peace I gave reasons for the opinion that this claim was contrary to our engagements and an act of international immorality. A good deal has been written about it since then, but I cannot admit that my conclusion has been seriously disputed. Most American writers accept it; most French writers ignore it; and most English writers try to show, not that the balance of evidence is against me, but that there are a few just plausible, or just not-negligible, observations to be made on the other side. Their contention is that of the Jesuit professors of probabilism in the seventeenth century, namely, that the Allies are justified unless it is absolutely certain that they are wrong, and that any probability in their favour, however small, is enough to save them from mortal sin.