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Chapter 7 - Conclusion

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 March 2012

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Summary

The collapse of the French in French Indo-China made Singapore useless as a base or as a repair station for heavy ships.

–The Marquess of Linlithgow, Viceroy of India, Delhi, 8 January 1942.
  1. (a) In case of French irresolution, can American or other intervention be arranged in a manner which will save all or part of Viet Nam without too grave consequences elsewhere?

  2. (b) In case of Bao Dai failing to give the leadership urgently required, is there an alternative political solution in Viet Nam which would prevent a Vietminh political victory?

  3. (c) In case of Tongkin being lost to the Vietminh, is it feasible and sound to attempt to divide Viet Nam and set up an independent State in the centre and south?

  4. (d) If all Viet Nam is lost, can we do anything effective to secure Laos and Cambodia against Vietminh military or political domination?

  5. (e) What can we do to strengthen further Siamese resistance to Vietminh and Communist influences?

–Malcolm MacDonald, Commissioner General for the United Kingdom in South East Asia, Singapore, 12 March 1954.

The interaction between British attitudes towards decolonized Indo-China and commitments east of Suez became an important policy-making issue in the early 1950s. The origins and character of the axiomatic assumption of Indo- China as an outpost of British regional interests have been approached in the preceding chapters as regards geopolitics, including its cultural dimension, the policy-making process as well as power by proxy.

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Publisher: Anthem Press
Print publication year: 2010

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  • Conclusion
  • Văn Dân Nông
  • Book: Churchill, Eden and Indo-China
  • Online publication: 05 March 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.7135/UPO9780857289551.008
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  • Conclusion
  • Văn Dân Nông
  • Book: Churchill, Eden and Indo-China
  • Online publication: 05 March 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.7135/UPO9780857289551.008
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Conclusion
  • Văn Dân Nông
  • Book: Churchill, Eden and Indo-China
  • Online publication: 05 March 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.7135/UPO9780857289551.008
Available formats
×