Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Chapter 1 Introduction
- Chapter 2 The War against Japan Had the South East Asia Department Emerge in the Foreign Office
- Chapter 3 The East of Suez Review: Détente for South East Asia?
- Chapter 4 The British Path towards Negotiations on Indo-China
- Chapter 5 The British Path towards the Partition of Vietnam
- Chapter 6 The Annamitic or Vietnamized Divide and Barrier of the ‘Smaller Dragon’
- Chapter 7 Conclusion
- Appendix: Maps
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Chapter 5 - The British Path towards the Partition of Vietnam
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 March 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Chapter 1 Introduction
- Chapter 2 The War against Japan Had the South East Asia Department Emerge in the Foreign Office
- Chapter 3 The East of Suez Review: Détente for South East Asia?
- Chapter 4 The British Path towards Negotiations on Indo-China
- Chapter 5 The British Path towards the Partition of Vietnam
- Chapter 6 The Annamitic or Vietnamized Divide and Barrier of the ‘Smaller Dragon’
- Chapter 7 Conclusion
- Appendix: Maps
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Don't you see it is a trap; there is no line there; it is a trap and they would overrun the whole place.
–Eden to Churchill upon the call by Izvestia for a cease-fire in Indo-China, 8 April 1954.The Prime Minister said that he hoped that the forthcoming attitude adopted by Mr. Dulles towards the problems of South-East Asia might be followed by an equally positive contribution towards the problems of the Middle East.
–Churchill at the cabinet, 13 April 1954.Eden repeated that Churchill “would not send troops to Vietnam”.
–Eden to US Under-Secretary of State General Bedell Smith, 12 June 1954.Both the French and the historians of the last Vietnamese dynasty have tried hard to depict the Tay Son brothers as bandit leaders, although some of the French at least recognized the youngest, Hue, as a military genius of Napoleonic stature.
–Joseph Buttinger, The Smaller Dragon: A Political History of Vietnam (London and New York: Atlantic Books and Praeger 1958), 175–6.Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden warned before the opening of the Geneva Conference of 1954 that while there was the first objective ‘on the Western side’ to press for Korean unification and free elections, one had to be prepared for what he called the ‘fall back’ stance.
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- Information
- Churchill, Eden and Indo-China , pp. 111 - 178Publisher: Anthem PressPrint publication year: 2010