Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of the Philosophy of Language
- Cambridge Handbooks in Language and Linguistics
- The Cambridge Handbook of the Philosophy of Language
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Preface
- 1 Philosophy of Language: Definitions, Disciplines, and Approaches
- Part I The Past, Present, and Future of Philosophy of Language
- Part II Some Foundational Issues
- Part III From Truth to Vagueness
- Part IV Issues in Semantics and Pragmatics
- Part V Philosophical Implications and Linguistic Theories
- 26 Philosophical Implications of Generative Grammar
- 27 Conceptual Semantics and Its Implications for Philosophy of Language
- 28 Relevance Theory and the Philosophy of Language
- 29 Mental Files
- 30 Contemporary Discourse Studies and Philosophy of Language
- Part VI Some Extensions
- References
- Index
29 - Mental Files
from Part V - Philosophical Implications and Linguistic Theories
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 November 2021
- The Cambridge Handbook of the Philosophy of Language
- Cambridge Handbooks in Language and Linguistics
- The Cambridge Handbook of the Philosophy of Language
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Preface
- 1 Philosophy of Language: Definitions, Disciplines, and Approaches
- Part I The Past, Present, and Future of Philosophy of Language
- Part II Some Foundational Issues
- Part III From Truth to Vagueness
- Part IV Issues in Semantics and Pragmatics
- Part V Philosophical Implications and Linguistic Theories
- 26 Philosophical Implications of Generative Grammar
- 27 Conceptual Semantics and Its Implications for Philosophy of Language
- 28 Relevance Theory and the Philosophy of Language
- 29 Mental Files
- 30 Contemporary Discourse Studies and Philosophy of Language
- Part VI Some Extensions
- References
- Index
Summary
A rational subject, S, may take different (and possibly conflicting) attitudes toward the judgment that a given individual is F – for example, she may reject it as false or accept it as true – depending on how that individual is presented. She may think that Emile Ajar is a genius, while thinking that Romain Gary is a has-been (hence, not, or no longer, a genius). Since Emile Ajar is Romain Gary, our subject S ascribes to the same individual the property of being and not being a genius. Is that irrational of her? No, of course not, for she does not know that Ajar is Gary.
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- The Cambridge Handbook of the Philosophy of Language , pp. 535 - 547Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2021
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