If we consider that the concept of human dignity appeared only quite recently (after the Second World War) as a legal reference, we may have doubts regarding its utility. Why should we consider useful a concept which was legally non-existent since Roman legal reasoning? But we may interpret the question posed in the title of this chapter to raise another issue: what is the meaning of utility in a legal perspective? All lawyers – whether in the tradition of common law or civil law – know that the law uses concepts to create legal categories and to qualify facts and situations in order to incorporate them in the social theatre in which we all live. In that sense, the rationality of the law tends to have useful social meanings and does not need purely theoretical or metaphysical concepts because they cannot serve its main purpose: to maintain the organization of the society on the basis of legal norms. I understand that the vagueness and uncertainty of the concept of human dignity may create some trouble and disinterest in using it as a legal reference, especially for those who conceive of law as a practical exercise which aims at finding the appropriate answers to precise questions (discussed in the first section below). However, as a pragmatic lawyer, I have also to consider that the concept of human dignity is already present in international law as well as in different domestic legislation. Its appearance during the second part of the twentieth century should not be neglected in understanding the message sent by its introduction in law (discussed in the second section below).