THE BROAD CONTEXT

For Smith, sympathy cannot be detached from spectatorship, for it is spectators who sympathise. According to the doctrine of sympathy as developed in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, sympathy is consequent on a spectator's cognition of a person's feelings or emotions. I therefore begin with the concept of the spectator, and then turn to sympathy and to the relation between the two concepts.

The concept of the spectator, central to Smith's moral philosophy, had already been put to work, within the context of moral philosophical investigations, by both Hutcheson and Hume, and it is plausible to see Smith's writings on the spectator as a development of the work of his older colleagues. That the concept should have held their attention is easily explained. Wanting to pass judgment on whether I have acted well or badly, I have to consult others, for in so far as my judgment is not shaped by the views of others, it may be shaped instead, and therefore distorted, by my self-love or self-interest. At least I cannot be sure that my judgment is not distorted by these motives. Because I want to know what a disinterested judge would say, and because there are evident obstacles to my being a disinterested judge of my own acts, it is necessary for me to turn to others.