THE BOARD OF REVISION’s reports on the Victualling Board are a damning indictment of the whole of the management of the victualling, both in the victualling office in London and in the yards at home and abroad. The previous enquiries suggested some improvements but had basically concluded that the systems at the yards were adequate, conclusions which the Board of Revision found itself unable to comprehend. They tactfully remarked several times that it was the system which was at fault rather than the individuals running it, but they also made several comments which clearly indicated that they thought the commissioners were not up to the job: ‘… a want of judgement’, ‘unless all the commissioners be men of real ability, professional knowledge and uninterrupted industry’, ‘[chosen for no other reason than] their being the fittest men that can be found’.

Before coming to a conclusion on the management competence of the victualling commissioners who served during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars (or as close to a decision as one can come, given the elapsed time and the inherent danger of anachronism), it is perhaps wise to consider what the term actually means. By any standards, it has to mean the ability to get the whole job done promptly and properly, without allowing deep-seated problems to develop or remain without remedial action; with proper attention to detail, understanding of the processes and a willingness to instigate change when necessary. Thus far we can be objective; to what extent the victualling commissioners did demonstrate this ability is necessarily subjective. Any judgement on success is dependant on who is judging it, and here there are, and were, different views on the importance of the various parts of the task and how well these were achieved.

To the naval seamen and officers of the day, the primary (perhaps the only important) objective was to get sufficient quantities of good food on to the seaman’s plate; this was important not only to fuel the fighting machine, but also to maintain the morale which kept that machine enthusiastic. This viewpoint has dominated the historiography of the subject, as written by and for naval historians and as written by and for serving officers.