One of the most vibrant topics in the social sciences in recent years has been corporate governance. Awareness of the impact of different corporate governance models on economic performance led to much comparative analysis on the “best” corporate governance model. Similarly, it was suggested that globalization would push governments to adopt this “best” model in order to maintain competitiveness. More recently, there has been a tendency to highlight the continuation of distinctive national models in the context of the varieties of capitalism literature. At the heart of this literature lies a distinction between two “types” of corporate governance: the Anglo-Saxon model, a company-based system based on a fiduciary relationship between shareholders and managers, and a continental, or enterprise-based, system, in which stakeholders are more center stage. The impact of European integration on these models has been a fertile ground of study in recent years and with it the emergence of the concept of Europeanization. In applying this concept, attention has shifted from a bottom–up process of the dynamics of European integration to a top–down focus on the effects of EU membership on member states. In this context one area of attention has been the impact of EU directives aimed at company law harmonization to see if the EU is moving to a center ground between these two models of capitalism, or whether one of them is becoming more dominant.