The Committee, Again ~ The Directorate Undone ~ Lloyd George Departs

Dissatisfaction in government circles over the quality and reliability of HUMINT peaked in mid-1921. In India, officials felt reports were only trite compilations of information ‘from Foreign Office and War Office intercepts’. On the effect of Bolshevism on Indian internal affairs, wrote one politician, there was ‘absolutely nothing of interest’. In Britain, Basil Thomson contradicted himself from one week to the next. This became increasingly untenable as industrial unrest and unemployment neared their highest levels between 1917 and 1929, and government looked to cut spending.

In addition to economies demanded of British intelligence, this chapter focuses on events from March 1921 to November 1922 that led to HUMINT improvements overseas and domestically. The reforms eliminated some but not all factors politicising (and therefore distorting) HUMINT on Bolshevism. After all, if ministers expected information to conform to their own biases, there was little even top intelligence officials could (or would) do. The challenge was that some ministers and officials shared these preconceptions, creating a symbiotic relationship. Because reforms only happened when there was little choice left, the damage done to perceptions of HUMINT was considerable and lasting.

As for SIGINT, events this period highlighted the importance of preserving access to it. GCCS defeated a range of Bolshevik codes and ciphers until December 1920 when Mikhail Frunze warned Moscow about British successes. After Russia introduced new systems in early January 1921, GCCS faced serious difficulties but from ‘April 1921 to late 1923 again broke such traffic’. Access faltered once more in January 1924, when the Soviets changed systems, but resumed by spring 1925. the literature normally neglects is that from Frunze’s warning on, GCCS rarely broke Bolshevik diplomatic traffic again in Europe: