Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1 The legacy of the Munich conference
- 2 March 1939 and the decision to build an eastern front
- 3 The British guarantee to Poland
- 4 The military consequences of British involvement in the east
- 5 The financing of the eastern front
- 6 The Soviet Union: the rejected partner
- 7 August 1939
- 8 September 1939: war in the east
- Appendix 1
- Appendix 2
- Appendix 3
- Appendix 4
- Notes
- Select bibliography
- Index
7 - August 1939
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 September 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1 The legacy of the Munich conference
- 2 March 1939 and the decision to build an eastern front
- 3 The British guarantee to Poland
- 4 The military consequences of British involvement in the east
- 5 The financing of the eastern front
- 6 The Soviet Union: the rejected partner
- 7 August 1939
- 8 September 1939: war in the east
- Appendix 1
- Appendix 2
- Appendix 3
- Appendix 4
- Notes
- Select bibliography
- Index
Summary
By August 1939 the contradictory nature of the Anglo–Polish relationship had manifested itself in most of the exchanges and arrangements made between them. The incompatability of this partnership was highlighted during August because of the rapid escalation of tension between Poland and Germany, most notably over the issue of Danzig and also because both sides did recognise that war was inevitable in the near future. This realisation of the imminence of a European war did not affect the Polish–British relationship constructively. Each side had earlier recognised the military impotence of their relationship and both had viewed the bilateral agreement as a political gesture. The inevitability of war breaking out accentuated the difference of perspectives that had always existed between Poland and Britain. Understandably Poland was preparing for war to defend her sovereignty if not her very existence, while Britain pensively contemplated the undesirability of German aggression and further aggrandisement at the expense of Central and Eastern Europe.
Most Polish politicians and military leaders sought to reassure themselves of the maximum British commitment to fighting Germany. However, they remained suspicious and fearful that the Danzig crisis would be seized by Britain as an opportunity for a new ‘Munich’. Polish fears had been heightened by the dilatory attitude of both Britain and France made apparent during the staff and financial talks.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Britain, Poland and the Eastern Front, 1939 , pp. 151 - 173Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1987