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Chapter 6 - The South Sea Company and its Plan for a Navel Expedition in 1712

from PART II - IMPACT ON REALITY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 September 2013

Shinsuke Satsuma
Affiliation:
Completed his doctorate in maritime history at the University of Exeter
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Summary

As we saw in Chapter 4, expeditions to Spanish America did not materialise during the War of the Spanish Succession, and the only large-scale colonial expedition that was actually undertaken was destined for Quebec. At that time, however, there was another attempt to gain access to the wealth of Spanish America: the plan for establishing the South Sea Company, proposed by Robert Harley.

It is well known that the South Sea Company, which later triggered a famous financial crisis in 1720, was originally established to resolve the government's floating debts contracted during the War of the Spanish Succession. It is also known that the company was awarded the Asiento, that is, the exclusive right to trade slaves to the Spanish-American colonies, and was also granted the right to send annual ships with cargoes in return for undertaking the government's debts. However, it is far less known that the company was planning to send a naval expedition to the Pacific in 1712.

Economic or financial historians who look at the history of the South Sea Company tend to discard this expedition as a mere bluff contrived by Harley to assist his peace negotiations with France. John G. Sperling views the proposed expedition as a ‘farce’ and offers the ministry's need to cover up the peace negotiations as the only plausible explanation. Likewise, P.G.M. Dickson, following Sperling's interpretation, sees this expedition as ‘no more than a flight of fancy’.

Type
Chapter
Information
Britain and Colonial Maritime War in the Early Eighteenth Century
Silver, Seapower and the Atlantic
, pp. 160 - 188
Publisher: Boydell & Brewer
Print publication year: 2013

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