In post-reformasi Indonesia, we have not seen much progress in the attention given to minority rights, to groups holding “alternative” beliefs, or to small sects. Various cases of violence against and expulsions of minority sects—such as the Shias in Sampang, Madura (East Java) and the Ahmadis in Lombok—attest to this. Also lacking has been any protection for or rehabilitation of victims of violence and expulsions. And to the further detriment of some of these groups, rights that they had been accorded in the past have now been reduced. A case in point is that of the Ahmadiyah. Under the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono administration (2004–9), three joint ministerial decrees were passed that limit the activities of the sect. Two bills—the Religious Harmony Bill and the Penal Code Bill—that had reached the draft stage are no longer being actively discussed in parliament. From what is known about them so far though, should the laws be passed the situation would potentially be more discriminatory towards these groups than the status quo.

In the case of economic rights for the poor and marginalized groups and for the victims of political violence under the New Order government (1966–98), whilst there has been little in the way of substantive progress, discussions about them in the public sphere at least have been robust. And some inroads have been made, with the introduction of new laws such as the Special Autonomy Law for Aceh and Papua—the two regions subject to the greatest repression during the New Order—providing affected groups some form of rights. With the passing of a new Village Law (Undang-undang Desa, UU No 6/2014), economic distribution to indigenous communities and villages affected by the decentralization exercise witnessed significant improvements. Conversely, the Constitutional Court's 2017 decision has not received adequate follow-up by the government of President Joko Widodo (Jokowi). The decision ordered that groups falling under the categories of “Aliran Kepercayaan” or “Aliran Kebatinan” (local beliefs) be accorded recognition similar to that received by the six “official religions” (Islam, Protestant Christianity, Roman Catholic Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism). The government remains hesitant in listening to mainstream Muslim voices calling for improvements on this aspect, but has instead allowed counter narrative voices to be dominant in the public sphere.