

**KRIEGSALLIANZ UND WIRTSCHAFTSINTERESSEN: RUSSLAND IN DEN WIRTSCHAFTSPÄNEN ENGLANDS UND FRANKREICHS, 1914–1917.** By *Bernd Bonwetsch*. Studien zur modernen Geschichte, no. 10. Düsseldorf: Bertelsmann Universitätsverlag, 1973. 256 pp. DM 29, paper.

Bernd Bonwetsch's study of the relation of the economic interests of France, Great Britain, and Russia to their wartime alliance of 1914–17 is a revised version of a Hamburg doctoral dissertation. Basing his study on American, British, French, and Russian archival materials located in Birmingham, London, Paris, New York, Stanford, and Washington and on extensive published sources and secondary works, Bonwetsch examines in considerable detail how World War I influenced certain British, French, and Russian businessmen, politicians, and publicists to look to victory as a means of crippling Germany, not only militarily but also economically. In Russia, however, an extreme anti-German, postwar economic policy received only limited support, for Russians did not want to be mere suppliers of raw materials for French and British industry and had little to gain from allowing Britain and France to replace Germany as the principal foreign supplier of industrial goods for the Russian market. Indeed, in many ways the Russian and German economies complemented one another, and the Russian champions of economic discrimination against Germany, therefore, tended to be either nationalists who wished to undermine Germany's position as a world power or diplomats who were interested in strengthening the wartime alliance.

Bonwetsch's monograph is well conceived and organized and written in clear historical prose. It is of interest to both diplomatic and economic historians. Diplomatic historians will find it of value as a case study in how conflicting economic interests can affect the relations of wartime allies. For the economic historian Bonwetsch offers both insight into the nature of wartime economic policy-making in Britain, France, and Russia and a discussion of the postwar prospects (assuming victory and political continuity) of the Russian economy. He assesses these prospects more pessimistically than Alexander Gerschenkron and John P. McKay do, emphasizing that unresolved agricultural problems and the addition of a heavy burden of wartime debt to what Russia already owed her Western allies seriously called into question whether or not there would be a resumption of the rapid rate of economic expansion that had taken place in Russia during the nineties and between 1908 and 1914.

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**RUSSIA AND ASIA: ESSAYS ON THE INFLUENCE OF RUSSIA ON THE ASIAN PEOPLES.** Edited by *Wayne S. Vucinich*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972. xiv, 521 pp. \$15.00.

This volume presents revised versions of papers originally read in late 1967 at a conference on "The Russian Impact on Asia." The Asian peoples or countries are treated in articles on the Georgians (David M. Lang), Armenians (Vartan Gregorian), Muslims in European Russia and the Caucasus (Alexandre Bennigsen) and in Central Asia (Manuel Sarkisyanz), Siberian peoples (Stephen P. and Ethel Dunn), China (Mark Mancall), and Japan (George A. Lensen). These essays are preceded by historical surveys of Russian attitudes toward Asia (N. V. Riasan-