

IGNATIEV AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BULGARIAN EX-ARCHATE, 1864–1872: A STUDY IN PERSONAL DIPLOMACY. By *Thomas A. Meininger*. Madison: The State Historical Society of Wisconsin for the Department of History, University of Wisconsin, 1970. xii, 251 pp. \$3.50.

Drawing on the literature and published documents, this monograph carefully traces Nikolai Ignatiev's role in the complicated political and religious quarrels leading to the formation of the Bulgarian Exarchate and the schism of 1872. The author makes several important points. Ignatiev's policy in this question was distinctly personal, his diplomacy active and indefatigable. His principal aim was always to break up the Ottoman Empire and promote Russian interests and power, but next in importance for him was the unity of the Orthodox Church. Though always sympathetic to the Bulgarians, Ignatiev constantly tried to satisfy them within the framework of Orthodox unity. Only when defeated by events and the force of Balkan nationalism did he come to champion Bulgarians over Greeks.

Unfortunately there are defects in this generally useful book. For reasons of economy it was not given the usual editorial attention, and is marred by many awkward phrases and ill-chosen or inaccurately used words. The author's claim that Ignatiev had a pivotal, dynamic role in forming the Exarchate seems to me unsubstantiated. The story is much more one of Ignatiev's defeats, Pyrrhic victories, and accommodation to forces he could not control. Finally, Meininger's favorable view of Ignatiev verges at times on naïveté. He credits Ignatiev with remarkable prescience in foreseeing that internecine Balkan wars would result from the revolutions Ignatiev was promoting. Others might regard this as proof of criminal recklessness. He denies that Ignatiev's Pan-Slav plans really represented a dangerous Russian nationalism, insisting that Ignatiev viewed them as a defense against Germany, that Russia's leading position in the Slavic world was natural, and that Ignatiev wanted other Slavic peoples to gain as well as the Russians. Every Pan-German made the same argument, *mutatis mutandis*, for a German-dominated *Mittleuropa*. Moreover, in wanting to break up Austria-Hungary, Ignatiev chose the best way to make the German threat a deadly reality. Certainly Ignatiev's assumptions should be presented fairly—but also without burking the illusions and hubris they contained.

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THE TROUBLED ALLIANCE: GERMAN-AUSTRIAN RELATIONS, 1914 TO 1917. By *Gerard E. Silberstein*. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1970. xiii, 366 pp. \$12.50.

The title of this study is somewhat misleading. It implies a general account of the relations between Germany and Austria-Hungary from 1914 to 1917. Actually, it deals only with one particular aspect of their relations—their diplomatic efforts to secure the adherence of the Balkan states and Turkey to the Central alliance in World War I.

Since it was the Austro-Serb conflict that precipitated the war, Serbia was literally the first Allied nation. Montenegro associated herself with Serbia from the beginning of the war, but the other Balkan states and Turkey were not drawn in until later. In the diplomatic duel for their allegiance that developed

between the Central Powers and the Allies, the Central Powers were on the whole more successful. They secured the adherence of Turkey in 1914 and of Bulgaria in 1915, while the Allies obtained only that of Rumania in 1916. In Greece the strain of the contest between the two belligerent camps for her allegiance provoked a schism and civil war between the pro-Allied government of Venizelos at Salonika and the pro-German government of King Constantine at Athens. The schism was not healed until the summer of 1917 when the Allies intervened militarily in Greece and reunited the country forcibly under the pro-Allied Venizelos. Albania, which by 1914 had not yet constituted herself as a nation, properly speaking, became a battlefield without any diplomatic preliminaries.

The main facts of the story of the Central Powers' Balkan diplomacy in World War I have been known for some time. This book provides a systematic, day-by-day, document-by-document account of it, based on a thorough examination of the Wilhelmstrasse and Ballhausplatz archives. It is history for historians, not amateurs. It is, moreover, diplomatic history in the classic sense—that is, it concerns itself exclusively with the acts of statesmen and soldiers, not with public opinion and other factors that affect diplomatic history. Nor does the book concern itself with the moral aspects of who was right and who was wrong, but rather judges strictly by the pragmatic standard of who succeeded and who failed. It assumes a pretty thorough knowledge of the subject on the part of the reader, including the whole Allied side of the story. For a reader so equipped, it will make rewarding reading; for one less well prepared, it will only be confusing.

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THE TEACHING OF CHARLES FOURIER. By *Nicholas V. Riasanovsky*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969. xii, 256 pp. \$6.50.

It is ironical, as Maxime Leroy observed in a splendid chapter on Charles Fourier in his *Histoire des idées sociales en France*, that the most delirious of the social reformers should have provided the most forceful criticism of the "incoherences" of modern society. Fourier, like Robert Owen, is remembered primarily as an advocate of small, largely self-sufficient, and highly organized communities, but his theme was more profound, if simple. He insisted that all human ills flow from the repression and frustration of the natural passions of men, and claimed to have discovered the laws and organization of harmony and happiness through "passional attraction." He thought that he represented the next stage in the development of science after Newton's discovery of gravitational attraction. Surely, in the development of the idea of "social engineering" Fourier has an important place. Unfortunately his work has been rather inaccessible. Little has been translated into English, and even in French thorough study is painful because of the voluminous, repetitive, and peculiarly pedantic nature of his writing. We must therefore be grateful to Professor Riasanovsky for giving us the first general survey of Fourier's thought in English.

The book is for the most part a very good one. It is well written, thoroughly documented, and includes a good bibliography, both of Fourier's writings and of later analysis and commentary. A biographical chapter helps the reader under-