

peace before the American people? Should the latter have known better? And why these alternations in the public mood toward the Russians?

The author concentrates on the last question. His answer is that "most people's attitudes changed less as a result of specific events than according to the way opinion makers interpreted events and personalities for the public." This is not a very convincing analysis. Certainly, no matter what Walter Lippmann, Robert McCormick, and others wrote, or even what our government leaders proclaimed, two specific events had the decisive influence on American public opinion: first, both countries finding themselves as of December 1941 in a joint war effort, and, second, the Soviet Union's imperialist and repressive policies in Eastern Europe which the American public began to perceive as early as 1944, but which became fully and undeniably evident in 1945-46. The author evidently believes that what is known as "Cold War" need not have come "if Presidents Roosevelt and Truman and their secretaries could have told the American people throughout 1945 of America's and Russia's new power and of the new realities of the international order." But this is hardly realistic: no amount of presidential "public opinion leadership" could have persuaded the American people that they should not be indignant about what the USSR was doing in Poland, Rumania, and other East European countries. The writer also begs the question, and doubly so. The "new realities of the international order" did not necessarily mean that the United States had no option but to acquiesce in the Soviet policies in Eastern Europe. On the contrary, those realities, that is, America's enormous strength and Russia's relative weakness, should have urged that alert and tenacious American diplomacy could have secured for most Eastern European states at least some approximation of independence insofar as their internal affairs were concerned. In the second place, the Cold War did not result solely, or even mostly, from the Soviets being mad at us because we said unkind things about what they were doing in Poland and elsewhere. It also came because, with the war over, the Soviet Union for internal reasons sought to put a distance between itself and the West. Witness Stalin's refusal to participate in and draw benefits from the Marshall Plan.

The book is informative and valuable as long as it deals with factual material. It falters when the author shifts into another gear and attempts to philosophize.

ADAM B. ULAM
Harvard University

SPECIAL ENVOY TO CHURCHILL AND STALIN, 1941-1946. By *W. Averell Harriman and Elie Abel*. New York: Random House, 1975. xii, 595 pp. + 16 pp. photographs. \$15.00.

This is a well-written, familiar story of Big Three relationships during World War II, told from Averell Harriman's angle of vision. His collaboration with a professor of journalism and his decision to use the third person in referring to himself gives the book the air of a history rather than a formal memoir; and, in fact, the authors do draw quite extensively on sources other than Harriman's own recollections and dispatches to set the stage for matters in which he took a personal part. Robert Sherwood's *Roosevelt and Hopkins* was the bellwether for this sort of beefed-up memoir of World War II, and Harriman and Abel's contribution to the genre will stand comparison with any of its predecessors for general interest and readability.

The subject matter is, of course, familiar to anyone who has read about the Allied diplomacy of World War II. What is new is the insight into Harriman's own character and the tart judgments he makes of the men with whom he worked. He presents himself as a vigorous man of action and sound judgment, skilled in diplomacy.

If he has changed his mind on anything, he does not mention it. As he says in the preface: "Looking back over my experiences of some fifty years with the Soviet Union, I find that my basic judgments remain little altered. . . ." The core of that basic judgment was formed early on, when, in the course of pursuing business deals in Russia, he concluded that "the Bolshevik revolution was, in fact, a reactionary development. The dictatorship of the proletariat, providing that the few should make decisions for the many, and that the individual must be the servant of the state, seemed to me a regressive development substantially at odds with the legitimate aspirations of mankind. That was my view in 1926. I have had no reason to change it since" (p. 51).

Yet of Stalin he says: "I found him better informed than Roosevelt, more realistic than Churchill, in some ways the most effective of the war leaders. At the same time he was, of course, a murderous tyrant" (p. 536). If his judgment of Stalin's personal qualities is favorable, his appraisal of some of his fellow Americans is not. Of Eisenhower, for example, he says: ". . . he didn't have the faintest knowledge of what was going on in the United States. Although I liked Ike personally I did not feel that he was qualified to be President" (p. 375). As for Byrnes, Harriman presents a devastating picture of him as conceited, incompetent, and unwilling to take advice.

These and other sidelights on personalities and their interplay add piquancy to the story of great power relations. Harriman's tales of his difficulties in crossing the Atlantic by air in 1940 are a reminder, also, of how much conditions of transport have changed since World War II began. But except for one or two slighting remarks about historians' ways of misunderstanding matters, the book does not enter into the historiographical debates that have raged about the breakup of the Grand Alliance. Instead, it offers the testimony of an Old Roman, firm in the right as he sees the right, regretting nothing, or almost nothing in his own or the national record during these years, and proud of what was in fact accomplished.

WILLIAM H. McNEILL
University of Chicago

DEAN ACHESON: THE STATE DEPARTMENT YEARS. By *David S. McLellan*. New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1976. xiv, 466 pp. + 24 pp. photographs. \$17.50.

This study of Dean Acheson's State Department years by David S. McLellan, professor of political science at Miami University, Oxford, Ohio, though carefully researched and documented, is unfortunately flawed by the author's excessive concern to defend Acheson from attacks of critics on the right and left. More serious is McLellan's failure to deal adequately with the former secretary of state's personality, with his concepts of power in the conduct of diplomacy, and with his impact on the dynamics of the Cold War. What McLellan gives us is a surface account of Acheson's life and public career, which, despite the author's labor and zeal, adds little to Dean Acheson's own Pulitzer Prize-winning memoir, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department*, or to Gaddis Smith's biography of Acheson in the series "The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy," edited by Robert H. Ferrell.

The book briefly reviews Dean Gooderham Acheson's early life; his years in Middletown, Connecticut; the strong influence of his parents, particularly his father who served for many years as rector of the Holy Trinity Episcopalian Church; and his education at Groton, Yale, and Harvard Law School. It was not until Acheson began his training in law at Harvard that he experienced an intellectual awakening and a challenge that greatly affected the future direction of his life. Three persons made deep and lasting impressions upon him: Felix Frankfurter, his law professor at