

the United States. The arguments on this point will go on, but unless those who hold a contrary view turn up some extraordinary new and convincing evidence, this interpretation should stand the test of time.

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WAR SURVIVAL IN SOVIET STRATEGY: USSR CIVIL DEFENSE. By *Leon Gouré*. Foreword by *Ambassador Foy D. Kohler*. Monographs in International Affairs. Miami: Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1976. xxiv, 218 pp. Paper.

Soviet interest and activity in civil defense has recently become a subject of keen political and military concern—indeed, for some, a cause célèbre. Dr. Gouré has for many years been a leading authority on this heretofore esoteric field, and his recent volume is much to be welcomed. He addresses the subject from the standpoint of his—and the Miami Center's—broader concerns over Soviet political-military intentions and capabilities, as both this study and the foreword to it by former Ambassador Foy Kohler make very clear. At the same time, the book includes an extensive review of the copious and detailed Soviet open literature on civil defense. The availability, in an analytic summary, of this information to a readership of Soviet affairs specialists and more broadly of interested citizens is all to the good.

To this reviewer, the basic thesis underlying the study is unconvincing, and the conclusions as to broader Soviet policy intentions are unproven and in many cases unlikely. Too often, arguments are adduced on the basis of challengeable inference and then flatly stated as fact. For example, the author states that, “according to Soviet doctrine, the war survival of the Soviet Union will be *assured* [emphasis added] by a combination of a pre-emptive first counterforce strike . . . [various active defense measures] and civil defense” (p. 8). This statement is buttressed by a following sentence: “Thus, according to a 1974 statement by the Chief of USSR Civil Defense: while the armed forces will have as their ‘objective to prevent the use of destructive means against the rear’ . . . civil defense . . . will be responsible for assuring the ‘maximum weakening of the destructive effects’ of the surviving enemy’s strike force.” But public statements about an “objective” of the active role of the armed forces and “maximum weakening of the destructive effects” of enemy strikes in no way adds up to an unqualified conclusion that the Soviet leadership believes “the war survival of the Soviet Union *will be assured*”—not even the conditional tense of the verb!—by pursuing such means. Yet this is the nub of the question: Can Soviet civil defense measures, while evidently on a substantial scale and very much exceeding our own, really make a difference in the “Soviet ability to use military might as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy” (p. 3), and “bear importantly on Moscow’s strategic and risk calculations and on assessments of the probable outcome of a nuclear war between the USSR and the United States” (p. 3).

Dr. Gouré’s estimate is that the Soviet Union is, and for many years has been, spending about \$1 billion annually on civil defense, or about \$4 per person per year. (If true, incidentally, this is slightly *below* the per capita expenditure for civil defense of Sweden and West Germany, and far below that of Switzerland.)

One cannot do justice, in the confines of a brief review, to the arguments on various sides of such questions as: Why do the Soviet authorities devote substantial resources to civil defense? Does doctrine, or inertia, or bureaucratic politics, or international politics, or contingencies of war with the United States—or with China—account for intensified efforts, since the SALT Treaty in 1972 virtually ruled out

antiballistic missile active defenses? How effective are Soviet "war survival" measures—and how effective do the Soviet leaders consider them to be? And how—if at all—does this affect their foreign policies? This book argues one case, a case grounded in the assumption that Soviet policy and policymakers are dedicated to world domination, and that their operative policies are determined by this objective. Soviet policy aims appear simple and clear; too simple and too clear, and based too heavily on pronouncements which may serve various purposes. To cite but one example: "Soviet leaders today are the only ones who speak of gaining 'victory' in a nuclear war. *It follows from this [sic] that, in the Soviet view, a war-survival capability is an important 'strategic factor' . . .*" (p. 23). The author draws this and other similar conclusions, notwithstanding his admission (p. 18) that "it is, of course, not possible to assess how well USSR Civil Defense would perform in the event of a war," and despite many admitted and recognized deficiencies—unknowns such as the fact that "no large-scale evacuation exercises for entire cities have been held so far" (p. 17), and that "there are some indications of popular skepticism in the Soviet Union regarding the effectiveness of civil defense measures."

War Survival in Soviet Strategy makes a useful—if flawed—contribution to a subject which indeed deserves attention.

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THE SOVIET NAVY TODAY. By *Captain John E. Moore, R.N.* Introduction by *John Erickson*. New York: Stein and Day, 1976. 255 pp. Photographs. \$15.95.

Captain Moore, editor of *Jane's Fighting Ships*, has in this volume produced a poor man's *Jane's* (the larger tome having an astronomical cost for the individual reader). As such, it is an invaluable reference work, ranging from the latest 16,000-ton "Delta II" class ballistic missile submarines and 40,000-ton "Kuril" class aircraft carriers (which the Russians call "antisubmarine cruisers" in order to transit the Dardanelles legally) down to East German harbor tugs, Mi-4 Hound general purpose helicopters, and the 12,000-man Soviet Naval Infantry. The book is divided by ship types, each section introduced by a short historical narrative and each ship class replete with vital statistics, a silhouette, and one representative photograph. The photographic reproductions, incidentally, are of the usual superior Western quality.

But since statistics alone do not tell a story, Moore does, using the historical development of the post-World War II navy as his vehicle. His story line—in an initial chapter which serves as a scenario—is simply that the Soviet Union started from virtually nothing—Stalin's dream of a balanced fleet and the many devastated shipyards—and has since inexorably created a superb, quantitatively superior fleet that demonstrated its global capabilities in the Okean II maneuvers of April 1975, the latter event emphasized in John Erickson's introduction. Moore even goes so far as to suggest resemblances between Russia's thrust abroad for bases and nineteenth-century British imperialism; further, he regards the increasing number of long-range Soviet naval cruises as the measure of a new offensive navy. But he wrongly minimizes the geographical limitations. Constanta, Varna, or Sakhalin are no more "forward bases" than are San Diego, Dutch Harbor, or Guantánamo Bay (p. 20); and the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean anchorages and installations are hardly the major base facilities of, say, a Pearl Harbor, Subic Bay, or Holy Loch. Indeed, as Erickson says (p. 9), the Russians have erred most heavily in not establishing "an effective understanding of and relationship between naval capability and the pursuit of Russia's proper maritime interests or 'mission.'"