

author, it must be noted that he is fully aware of the problems inherent in this kind of research. The point made here is simply that the value of this volume lies in the detailed information which it provides on the development of Soviet Indian studies, not in its ability to elucidate the link between Soviet scholars and Soviet policy toward India.

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SOVIET POLICY TOWARD INDIA: IDEOLOGY AND STRATEGY. By Robert H. Donaldson. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974. xiv, 338 pp. \$15.00.

The importance which Moscow continues to place on its relations with India has been the subject of several books by Western as well as Indian scholars. Donaldson's study, as the author himself points out, is not a diplomatic history of Moscow's relations with New Delhi, nor is it a history of the Indian Communist movement. Instead, it focuses on Soviet efforts to bring about changes in Marxist-Leninist doctrine to suit their changing postures toward India. The author also convincingly challenges the way in which some writers have interpreted several important writings of the Stalin era.

Donaldson believes that considerations of Soviet national interests rather than those of ideology have determined Moscow's policy toward India. The Soviets, in his view, have gone through their own version of "de-eschatology" for the sake of national security and survival. From their earlier support of a violent revolution in India, they have moved to a position in which the slogan of armed struggle is pronounced "absurd." Even their assessment of Indian social forces has been guided by the requirements of Soviet foreign policy. To be sure, although they fully supported the "national bourgeois" government of Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the long-term goal, in doctrinal terms, of a Communist India has not been given up; but that, as the author rightly says, "must continue to be voiced if the remaining viability of Marxism-Leninism, both as an instrument of mass control and as a justification for the very rule of the Soviet leadership, is to be preserved."

If Soviet policy toward India is determined by Moscow's national interests, the same could also be said of India's policy toward the Soviets. But here Donaldson voices criticism which has been typical of many Western scholarly and journalistic writings. Pointing to the difference in India's stand on Suez and Hungary in 1956, he says: "India seemed to prefer to take her stand on clear-cut cases of 'imperialist aggression' against non-Western countries and to stand on the sidelines when Soviet aggression in Eastern Europe was at issue." India's policy on Hungary, as well as on many similar issues, should be seen in the light of Washington's reluctance to provide economic assistance to projects in the public sector and its pro-Pakistan stand on Kashmir in the United Nations. Moscow's policy on these issues, on the other hand, converged with India's concerns and objectives. Moreover, India feared a possible Western-sponsored U.N. action in Kashmir and, consequently, opposed a similar U.N. intervention in Hungary.

On the whole, Donaldson makes a careful and judicious use of his sources. A first-rate study, the book adds immensely to our understanding of Moscow's efforts to reinterpret Marxism-Leninism in order to justify or support changes in its foreign policy.

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