

Counter Reformation forces denounced the concept of toleration, the constitutional structure of the Commonwealth ensured that the policy could be abandoned only gradually.

Tazbir's work is not the product of new research, but is, rather, a new synthesis. Its chief merit rests in its examination of the evolution of religious thought in the context of the Commonwealth's society and political structure. The book is not as comprehensive as its title indicates; Tazbir's focus is on the relationship of Reform groups (Lutherans, Calvinists, Polish Brethren, and Czech Brethren) and Roman Catholicism. Relatively little space is devoted to the large population of Eastern Christians (Orthodox, Armenian, and Uniates), and almost no attention is paid to Jews and Muslims.

The English edition is not just a translation of the Polish original: a new introduction containing background information on the Commonwealth is provided, but without any indication that the text has been revised. More troubling, the English translation by A. T. Jordan is so free that it often omits passages and at times distorts the Polish original. For example, comparing pages 135–36 of the Polish original with pages 109–10 of the English text, one finds that "Orthodox" is translated by the awkward phrase "Orthodox Poles," that Prince Konstantyn Ostroz'kyi (Konstanty Ostrogski) is described as an advocate of the status quo, although the Polish reads "*status quo ante*" (*dawnego stanu rzeczy*), and that the translation omits substantive material from the Polish edition's discussion about pressure on the Orthodox church. In general, the English edition appears to be a simplified version of the Polish original. It is possible that Professor Tazbir agreed to many of these omissions, but the reader should be informed that the English version varies significantly from the original.

A series of translations of works such as Tazbir's would be a major service to Western scholars, but greater care must be taken to assure the accuracy of the English texts or to state clearly what type of modifications have been made.

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UPADEK KONSTYTUCJI 3 MAJA: STUDIUM HISTORYCZNE. By Jerzy Łojek. Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1976. 321 pp. Plates. 80 zł., paper.

The trauma of the eighteenth-century partitions has not ceased to affect twentieth-century Polish consciousness. It is, perhaps, not surprising then that the modest edition of this monograph (2,300 copies) allegedly vanished from Polish bookstores within a few days of its appearance.

The work surveys in considerable detail the period of the functioning of the 1791 Constitution—from its adoption in May of that year to its demise fifteen months later. Although much of the subject matter has been treated in earlier studies, such as the works of Smolenski, Korzon, Rostworowski, and others, no one has yet marshaled such extensive and diverse source material on this narrow period. Some facets of the topic, for example, Polish defense policy in 1792, have never before been covered. In general, the sections devoted to Poland's international situation based on research of extant archival fragments of relevant Polish diplomatic correspondence are informationally quite valuable.

Łojek's principal thesis is an indictment—perhaps the harshest yet in Polish historiography—not so much of the Russians or their Targowica quislings, as of the Polish leadership. He sees the principal responsibility for Poland's failure to maintain the new state structure as internal and political rather than external. The brunt of his attack is directed at the hapless Stanislaus Augustus for his political ineptitude. Łojek dismisses the king's later apologia of having been forced to operate with his

hands tied; the constitution, the author contends, concentrated considerable powers in the person of the monarch. It was Poniatowski's concern for dealing with internal opposition, insignificant by itself, which sapped his efforts and deflected them away from the necessity of coming to an understanding with the Russians. Because of Russian indecision over how to react, Łojek feels that accommodation through negotiation was feasible, even as late as the spring of 1792. The chances for a political solution preserving the essence of the new constitutional structure were far greater than subsequent historiography has allowed. This argument, based on a combination of printed Russian original sources as well as on various other material—including the reports of Deboli, the Polish envoy in St. Petersburg—appears as a leitmotif throughout the work. It is also one of the work's weaknesses. In spite of the author's forceful presentation of his case, conclusive evidence of what transpired at the St. Petersburg court is unavailable. His argument must remain hypothetical: the problem cannot be solved as long as relevant Russian archives are closed. Furthermore, uncertainty on this question in turn affects other principal arguments which depend on this premise.

Stanislaus Augustus is also excoriated for his decision to accede to the Targowica Confederation at a time when continued military resistance remained possible. Łojek does not believe that the disproportion of strength between the invading Russians and the Polish army was large enough to render a successful defense impossible. Premature capitulation, based on the fear of a second partition which in any event was not averted, both quashed any possible organization of popular resistance of the kind that developed in 1794, and eliminated the chances for a negotiated settlement.

The patriot leaders are also faulted. Some, like Malachowski or I. Potocki, failed to influence the king sufficiently, allowing him to vacillate and eventually to come under the influence of defeatists. Kołłataj proved a mere political opportunist; others, fleeing into ignominious exile at a time when the army had not yet been beaten and when public opinion counted on their continued leadership, ensured the victory of the Russian-backed Targowica conservatives.

In spite of the fact that Łojek's polemics and passionately argued thesis are likely to fuel the controversy which has recently surrounded another of his works, this monograph is a serious and significant contribution to the history of the partitions. That it was published by the Institute of Literary Studies of the Ossolineum rather than by the Historical Institute, as might have been expected, is a minor point of curiosity.

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ZBORNÍK ÚVAH A OSOBNÝCH SPOMIENOK O SLOVENSKOM NÁRODNOM POVSTANÍ. Edited by *Martin Kvetko* and *Miroslav Ján Ličko*. Toronto: Stála Konferencia Slovenských Demokratických Exulantov, 1976. 434 pp. Illus. \$10.80, paper. (Available from Dr. Martin Kvetko, c/o Czechoslovak Store, Inc., 1363 First Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10021.)

The Slovak National Uprising of 1944 is a significant, but controversial, theme of modern Slovak history. The uprising—the independent action by the newly formed bloc of forces of the Slovak national resistance movement—was provoked by their reluctance to wait passively for the end of the war, their desire to contribute to the defeat of Nazi Germany, and the need to demonstrate the will of the Slovak nation to act as a free agent in European affairs, as well as the autonomous partner of the Czechs in the newly liberated single state.

The uprising again came to play an important role in postwar Czechoslovakia: in the 1960s, the dispute over the interpretation of the background of the Slovak National Uprising and the revival of its tradition became a part of the reassessment of the system induced by the sociopolitical movement, whose aim it was to overcome