The NIH-Moderna mRNA COVID-19 vaccine’s steep price increase raises concerns that this will be the new anchor for continued price hikes and underscores the need for upstream government intervention to enable greater accountability and stewardship of public biomedical research investment.

In response to the recession brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic, EU-wide macroeconomic policy has launched an unprecedented coordinated fiscal expansion across the EU (Next Generation EU or NGEU), financed by issuing common debt. Given NGEU’s nature, it is essential to take fiscal spillovers into consideration when assessing the overall macroeconomic effects of this fiscal expansion. We quantify the effects of the additional public investment for all Member States in a rich macro-model with a trade structure. Our model suggests that, on average, GDP effects are around one-third larger when explicitly accounting for the spillover effects from individual-country measures. For small open economies with smaller NGEU allocations, spillover effects account for the bulk of the GDP impact. We also quantify key transmission channels.

Viruses and related graft-transmissible pathogens cause diseases that cost the grape industry billions of dollars annually if left uncontrolled. The National Clean Plant Network (NCPN), a USDA Farm Bill program, is an organization of clean plant centers that produce and maintain virus-tested foundation vine stocks and distribute propagation material derived thereof to nurseries and growers to minimize the introduction of viruses and virus-like diseases into the vineyard. Foundation Plant Services (FPS) is the major NCPN-grapes center. We examined the economic impacts of public investments in FPS from 2006 to 2019. By focusing on grapevine leafroll disease, our analyses revealed a benefit-cost ratio ranging from 22:1 to 96:1, with a 5% and a 20% disease infection rates in commercial vineyards, respectively. A welfare analysis was consistent with grape growers and nurseries capturing most (64–98%) of the benefits from adopting clean planting material compared with winemakers and other actors in the downstream wine supply chain system. This study provided new insights into the returns to public investments in a clean plant center and documented strong financial incentives for higher adoption of clean vines derived from virus-tested stocks, while justifying continued support of NCPN centers from public and private sectors.

This paper deals with public investment in High-Speed Rail (HSR) infrastructure and tries to understand the economic rationale for allocating public money to the construction of new HSR lines. The examination of data on costs and demand shows that the case for investing in HSR requires several conditions to be met: an ex ante high volume of traffic in the corridor where the new lines are built, significant time savings, high average willingness of potential users to pay, the release of capacity in the conventional rail network and airports. On the contrary, net environmental benefits seem to be insignificant in influencing the social desirability of HSR investment. This paper discusses, within a cost-benefit analysis framework, under which conditions the expected benefits could justify the investment in HSR projects.

Socioeconomic evaluation of a public investment helps to understand its value for the community, and it also improves an investment by analyzing its different components, and the risks inherent in its completion. The Act of 31 December 2012 about Public Finance Planning makes it mandatory in France for project sponsors to conduct an ex-ante socioeconomic evaluation of all public civil investments made by the State and its public institutions. An independent counter-expert assessment of the ex-ante socioeconomic evaluation is conducted for the largest projects. A permanent committee of experts has been established to specify the methodological rules for socioeconomic evaluation and define the studies and research necessary.

Increasingly, decentralization is being adopted by countries in which assumptions made by formal models of decentralization, such as electoral accountability and population mobility, fail to hold. How does decentralization affect public service delivery in such contexts? The authors exploit the partial rollout of decentralization in the autocratic context of Ethiopia and use a spatial regression discontinuity design to identify its effects. Decentralization improves delivery of productive services, specifically, agricultural services, but has no effect on social services, specifically, drinking water services. This finding is consistent with a model in which local leaders have superior information about the public investments that will deliver the greatest returns and they are incentivized by decentralization to maximize citizens’ production—on which rents depend—rather than citizens’ utility. These findings shed light on nonelectoral mechanisms through which decentralization affects public goods provision and help to explain decentralization’s mixed effects in many nondemocratic settings.

Why do governments in developing economies favor roads rather than schools in public investment scale-ups? We study this question using a dynamic general equilibrium model and argue that the different pace at which roads and schools contribute to economic growth, public debt intolerance, and political myopia are central to this decision. In a thought experiment with a large return differential in favor of schools, a benevolent government would intuitively devote the majority of an investment scale-up to them. However, the fraction of schools chosen by the government falls with increasing levels of debt intolerance and political myopia. In particular, political myopia is a meaningful explanation for the observed result to the extent that an extremely myopic government would not invest in schools at all.

We evaluate the global macroeconomic effects of cross-country-coordinated fiscal and monetary policies to counterbalance secular stagnation by simulating a five-region New Keynesian model of the world economy, calibrated to the United States (US), the euro area, Japan, China, and the rest of the world. The model includes investment in research and development (R&D) as a key factor affecting global growth. Our main findings are as follows. First, unfavorable technology developments may have played a nontrivial role in the global growth slowdown. Second, secular stagnation can be more effectively counterbalanced by coordinating global fiscal and monetary measures encouraging R&D accumulation. Third, these coordinated measures provide a larger welfare gain relative to a unilateral fiscal expansion.

There is a strong case for boosting public investment in many countries based on identified country-specific structural weaknesses and the relatively low levels of such investment. This paper analyses the potential macroeconomic benefits of increased public investment using simulations on NiGEM. The results suggest that the supply-side benefits from raising potential output are likely to lead to more favourable macroeconomic outcomes than those from using many other standard fiscal instruments, although it takes many years for the full effect on potential output to accumulate. Variant model simulations also suggest that a fiscal stimulus will be more effective in the short term the less it is offset by monetary policy, making well-targeted policy initiatives especially effective when policy interest rates are at the zero lower bound. Globalisation implies that spillover effects from collective action are larger than in the past, boosting multipliers relative to the case where countries take individual action, particularly in the first two years after the policy change. Such spillovers are likely to be particularly important in small open European economies, especially those strongly integrated in European value chains.

This paper examines the mechanisms through which government spending affects the dynamics of the real exchange rate. Using a two-sector dependent open economy model with intersectoral mobility costs for private capital, we show that public investment generates (i) a nonmonotonic U-shaped adjustment path for the real exchange rate with sharp intertemporal trade-offs and (ii) a crowding-in of private consumption, consistent with stylized facts. The effects of public consumption, however, are in sharp contrast to those of public investment. The effect of government spending on the real exchange rate depends critically on (i) the sectoral composition of public spending, (ii) the underlying financing policy, (iii) the sectoral intensity of private capital in production, (iv) the relative sectoral productivity of public infrastructure, (v) the elasticity of substitution in production, and (vi) intersectoral mobility costs for capital. In deriving these results, we identify conditions under which the predictions of the neoclassical open economy model can be reconciled with empirical regularities. Our results underscore the importance of decoupling the effects of government investment from those of government consumption in understanding the relationship between fiscal policy and the real exchange rate.

We present a set of theoretical and empirical papers and briefly describe the specific contributions to the Macroeconomic Dynamics special issue on technology aspects in the process of development.

This paper develops a model positing a nonlinear relationship between public investment and growth. The model is then applied to a panel of African countries, using nonlinear estimating procedures. The growth-maximizing level of public investment is estimated at about 10% of GDP, based on System GMM estimation. The paper further runs simulations, obtaining the constant optimal public investment share that maximizes the sum of discounted consumption as between 8.1% and 9.6% of GDP. Compared with the observed end-of-panel mean value of no more than 7.26%, these estimates suggest that there has been significant public underinvestment in Africa.

This paper examines trends in the socioeconomic well-being in rural counties where Black residents represent one third or more of the population. These racially diverse rural counties (RDRCs) are located exclusively in the rural South and generally have low levels of economic well-being. On a positive note, college education levels in RDRCs are found to have increased rapidly between 1990 and 2000. Regression analysis suggests that these increases were in part due to the concentration of Historically Black Colleges and Universities in the region. Local investments in K-12 education are also found to be linked to county education levels.

In contrast to its decentralized political economy model of the 1980s, China took a surprising turn towards recentralization in the mid-1990s. Its fiscal centralization, starting with the 1994 tax reforms, is well known, but political recentralization also has been under way to control cadres directly at township and village levels. Little-noticed measures designed to tighten administrative and fiscal regulation began to be implemented during approximately the same period in the mid-1990s. Over time these measures have succeeded in hollowing out the power of village and township cadres. The increasing reach of the central state is the direct result of explicit state policies that have taken power over economic resources that were once under the control of village and township cadres. This article examines the broad shift towards recentralization by examining the fiscal and political consequences of these policies at the village and township levels. Evidence for this shift comes from new survey data on village-level investments, administrative regulation and fiscal oversight, as well as township-level fiscal revenues, expenditures, transfers (between counties and townships) and public-goods investments.

In a very interesting endogenous growth model, Futagami, Iwaisako, and Ohdoi [Macroeconomic Dynamics 12 (2008), 445–462] study the long-run growth effect of borrowing for public investment. Their model exhibits (i) the multiplicity of balanced growth paths (BGPs) in the long run (two steady states) and (ii) a possible indeterminacy of the transition path to the high-growth BGP. The goal of this note is to show that their results depend on a sharp assumption, namely the definition of the public debt target as a ratio to private capital. If the target is defined in terms of public debt–to–GDP ratio, both results vanish: the model exhibits a unique BGP (no multiplicity) and the adjustment path to this unique equilibrium is determinate (no indeterminacy).

Since the 1980s public investment expenditures have been cut back in many OECD democracies. One explanation is a priority for fiscal stringency in order to curb big government in the context of neo-liberal ideas, which is reinforced by EMU requirements in the 1990s. Another is the potential impact of left and right partisan politics on investment policies. The main finding here is that the overall decrease in public investment expenditure appears to be caused by collateral damage due to the downsizing of total government outlays. This is particularly the case where there is a policy legacy of the Left with high levels of total public spending on the welfare state prior to the 1980s. Where the Right in government has been dominant after 1980, this downward development in public investment is particularly noticeable.

This paper provides an assessment of public capital spending within a macroeconomic policy model with explicit monetary and fiscal interactions, in contrast to most of the existing analyses of public investment that utilize “real” general equilibrium models. As such, we are able to consider the interactions of public investment with inflation, taxation, and public debt. Our results indicate that a clear trade-off exists between the costs and benefits of public investment, as is the case in the existing literature. However, the use of a monetary-fiscal policy model rather than a “real” general equilibrium one enables us to trace the macroeconomic channels including monetary ones through which these costs and benefits are transmitted to the rest of the economy. To the extent that these costs and benefits vary between countries, our results provide a potential explanation for the mixed empirical findings on the real effects of public capital spending.