Search theory is used to present a theoretically defensible model to examine the effectiveness of use value assessment (UVA) in preserving farmland. The model is empirically tractable and supports the findings of past research. The analysis considers the impact of farm income, uncertainty, and the distribution of the offer price on the effectiveness of UVA in preserving farmland and shows, through the effect on the reservation price, that for a given distribution of the offer price, property-tax rate, and the difference between market-value and use-value of land, the preservation of agricultural land only takes place within a relevant range.

Models of the exchange process based on search theory can be used to analyze the features of objects that make them more or less likely to emerge as money in equilibrium. These models illustrate the trade-off between endogenous acceptability (an equilibrium property) and intrinsic characteristics of goods, such as storability or recognizability. We look at how the relative supply and demand for various goods affect their likelihood of becoming money. Intuitively, goods in high demand and/or low supply are more likely to appear as commodity money, subject to the qualification that which object ends up circulating as a medium of exchange depends at least partly on convention. Welfare properties and fiat money are discussed.

This paper studies the effects of employment protection legislation when job separation requires a mandatory advance notice or a firm's costly closure. In a tight labor market, firms use mandatory notice since job-to-job transitions reduce the expected firing costs. In a world without the lengthy procedure imposed by advance notice, job turnover is mainly accommodated by unemployment inflows. As notice length increases, the fraction of job turnover accounted for by job-to-job movements increases. These results are consistent with the fact that the North American and European markets, despite their difference in employment protection legislation, have different unemployment flows but similar job flows.

In the excavation of archaeological remains of high value, a search tool with low cost can be used at first, but if we reach a stratum which is very likely to contain valuable material we must use a search tool with high efficiency to reduce the risk of destruction of the remains even if this is more expensive. Which tool should we use at each time? Furthermore, if the search costs too much in comparison with the reward of detection, it is not profitable to go on searching for ever. When should we stop the search? We answer these questions for continuous and discrete models.

We consider a non-zero-sum game in which two searchers (player I and II) compete with each other for quicker detection of an object hidden in one of n boxes. Let p (q) be the prior location distribution of the object for player I (II). Exponential detection functions are assumed for both players. Each player wishes to maximize the probability that he detects the object before the opponent detects it. In the general case, a Nash equilibrium point is obtained in the form of a solution of simultaneous differential equations. In the case of p = q, we obtain an explicit solution showing the surprising result that both players have the same equilibrium strategy even though the detection rates are different.

We consider a game in which one player hides a ball in one of n boxes and the other player is allowed to search for it. There are known probabilities that the searcher will overlook the ball if he searches the correct box. The hider wishes to minimize and the searcher to maximize the probability that the ball will be found in m or fewer searches. We exhibit a procedure which allows efficient computation of optimal strategies for both players without solving the game as a linear program. The results are extended to a non-zero-sum game where the searcher's objective is to minimize the expected time until the ball is found.

Let {xk}k ≧ − r be a simple Bernoulli random walk with x–r = 0. An integer valued threshold ϕ = {ϕk}k≧1 is called a search plan if |ϕk+1−ϕk|≦1 for all k ≧ 1. If ϕ is a search plan let τϕ be the smallest integer k such that x and ϕ cross or touch at k. We show the existence of a search plan ϕ such that ϕ1 = 0, the definition of ϕ does not depend on r, and the first crossing time τϕ has finite mean (and in fact finite moments of all orders). The analogous problem for the Wiener process is also solved.