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Community detection is a set of algorithms developed in network science to find meaningful sub-groups within larger groups. This article (1) outlines and evaluates the method and (2) shows how it can enrich ongoing debates about European integration. To this end, it uses the example of the approximation of laws, an enduring topic in European legal studies.
The purpose of this short research note is to draw attention to two major pitfalls of working with databases of decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The first one is technical in nature and relates to the discrepant coverage of the Curia and Eur-Lex databases. The second one is linguistic in nature and relates to the fact that most scholars using these databases work in English. New work on this front is capable of addressing the first issue but a change to research practices would be required to address the second.
The European Legal order, created by the European Court of Justice [ECJ], is an astonishingly effective treaty enforcement system. Previous explanations of its ‘transnational’ or ‘constitutional’ development have focused on the politics of judicial networks, and the wider political and economic context of postwar European democracy. Judicial biography has been almost entirely overlooked, even in the case of Robert Lecourt, widely acknowledged as the leading judge in the Court’s revolutionary period. Unknown to research on the ECJ, however, Lecourt had already spearheaded the adoption of the famous Article 49-3 of France’s 1958 Constitution. This paper demonstrates that the constitutional doctrines of European law and Article 49-3 were in fact premised on a similar ideology, that the pursuit of ‘effectiveness’ may require unprecedented restrictions on the traditional law-making role of national parliaments. Those were the constitutional values of the judge that, more than any other, built the foundations of the European legal order.
This chapter focuses on transnational solidarity conflicts, that is, a new type of distributional conflict which encompasses both quarrels about the adaptation of domestic welfare systems to EMU requirements and the distribution of costs and benefits between Member States. It seeks to understand how constitutional accountability may contribute to constructive management of such conflicts. In addressing this question, the chapter focuses specifically on the accountability goods of openness and publicness. It analyses the case law of the German and the Portuguese constitutional court as well as of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) following the Eurozone crisis. Domestic courts applied mostly a deductive approach to accountability in the EMU and thereby also tended to ‘nationalise’ transnational solidarity conflicts rather than acknowledge their European dimension. By contrast, the CJEU made the European constitutional dimension visible, thereby contributing more to openness. However, by focusing mostly on economic constitutional values, while only hesitantly applying other constitutional values such as social rights as a benchmark for substantive accountability it ensured publicness only to a limited extent. In conclusion, both domestic and European constitutional accountability mechanisms did not ensure meaningful accountability in the sense of concretizing and re-negotiating constitutional common goods.
This chapter provides the volumes general conceptual framework. It begins by addressing why new approaches to accountability are needed, arguing that accountability literature has reached a stalemate as a result of an impasse between deductive and inductive approaches to accountability in the EU. It then argues that overcoming the stalemate requires developing a generalised framework of what accountability is for, deriving four accountability goods to be used in subsequent chapters. The chapter argues that each of the goods can be delivered in procedural or substantive ways, focusing either on the process by which decisions are made or the substantive worth of decisions themselves. The chapter concludes by discussing the strengths and weaknesses of both varieties of accountability before mapping out how the concepts will be applied across policy fields and institutions in subsequent chapters.
The EU has become an increasingly powerful economic actor but we lack research on how EU economic decision-makers can be held to account. This book argues that the EU suffers from important substantive accountability deficits I.e. while numerous procedures exist to hold institutions like the Commission and ECB to account, there are few mechanisms to contest the merit and impact of economic decisions. The book combines detailed empirical research on how accountability practices are evolving across different fields of EU economic governance with a novel conceptual framework to assess where accountability deficits lie and how they might be addressed. Combining leading research in law and political science, this book will be of interest to scholars with an interest in the questions of accountability and economic governance arising from the budgets, central banks and financial institutions of the European Union. This title is Open Access.
This Article draws on research into precedent and the European Court of Justice to argue that it is distinctive in almost never retreating from a standpoint it has taken, or overturning an earlier judgement, by contrast with other Supreme Courts where this is a more common occurrence. The Article then considers the implications of this finding for research into the relationship between the Court and other actors, such as Member States, litigants and institutions. It suggests that in considering how the Court may be influenced and constrained this research takes insufficient account of its apparently limited capacity to change doctrinal direction. Evidence of doctrinal path dependence needs to be a more central part of discussions of the Court as a relational actor.
The preliminary reference procedure is today the ‘infringement procedure of the European citizen’. Although it was initially designed as a mechanism for judicial cooperation, the procedure soon became an instrument for supranational judicial review of national legislation. Such a discrepancy between the intended role of the preliminary reference procedure and its actual use in practice has important consequences that are yet to be fully explored in the literature. Indeed, how can the Court of Justice appropriately review national legislation through a procedure designed for interpreting EU law? Is the procedure governing the preliminary reference mechanism suitable to perform such a role? In this paper, we focus on one issue in particular: the way in which the Court of Justice gains information regarding the legal and factual background of the case. The Court has long recognised that appropriate knowledge of the factual and legal context of the referred case is a necessary prerequisite to performing its scrutiny and that, in accordance with the judicial cooperation model, such information is provided by the national judge. The Article critically examines the rules of procedures and the case law to show that the national judge certainly plays a key role, but other actors contribute to shaping the Court’s knowledge too. After an analysis of each actor’s role, the Article concludes that the procedure offers few guarantees as to the effective participation of individual parties to the advantage of other actors in the proceedings, increasing the risk of having partial or unbalanced information regarding the legal and factual background of the cases.
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is often viewed as a revered champion of opposition to autocratic reforms in the Member States. In the context of the rule of law crisis in Poland, however, its resolute support for judicial independence contrasts notably with the limited improvements for judges on the ground. As the present investigation suggests, this discrepancy can be explained by a mode of incremental adjustments at national level that has allowed Polish lawmakers to repeatedly neutralise the effects of the Court’s interventions. Resulting from this strategy are several instances of mutually responsive interaction between the Court of Justice and autocratic national lawmakers that have shaped developments in the rule of law crisis, both at national and supranational level. At national level, lawmakers have incrementally adjusted reforms to comply – at least superficially – with supranational judicial interventions, whereas the Court refined its interpretation of supranational safeguards of judicial independence in response to incremental adjustments in Polish law. Yet, more recently, this interaction of inadvertent mutual inspiration may have come to a halt. Rather than changing national law to superficially respond to supranational judicial interventions, Polish authorities may increasingly deny the Court’s authority to adjudicate in matters of judicial independence in the Member States altogether.
EU law has a complex relationship with the concept of peremptory norms. On the one hand, the case law of the ECJ shows a pattern of ‘avoidance’ of peremptory norms of general international law, namely a reluctance by this Court to consider the legal effects of such norms in cases where they may be relevant. This is clear in the Kadi and Front Polisario/Western Sahara sagas. On the other hand, EU law has ‘assimilated’ the concept of peremptory norms more than it may seem at first sight. Indeed, it may be affirmed that EU law has its own system of peremptory norms. Such as system is based on norms and principles that have some of the defining features of the peremptory norms of general international law (including a system of enhanced responsibility for serious breaches of such peremptory norms). While, in analytical terms, this characterization does not matter much for EU law, it is certainly critical to the proposition that general international law does not exclude the existence of a regional jus cogens.
This chapter studies the role of the EU and EU Member States in relation to disasters and land-use planning. The work analyzes how land-use planning can evaluate and manage risks to avoid disasters, paying special attention to European use of the precautionary principle. The analysis uses especially, but not only, the example of the Spanish legal system, taking into account its inclusion in the more general EU legal system. The study also considers private and public liability in relation to disasters, underlining how, in recent years, EU law and European caselaw have created a common framework based on the right to good administration. The study includes a reference to the famous case decided by the Dutch Supreme Court at the end of 2019 ordering the Government to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in accordance with the duty of due diligence or due care. Finally, this chapter explores possible consequences of maladministration when taking planning decisions in relation to possible public liability, using two real Spanish cases as specific examples.
How should judges of the European Court of Justice be selected, who should participate in the Court's proceedings and how should judgments be drafted? These questions have remained blind spots in the normative literature on the Court. This book aims to address them. It describes a vast, yet incomplete transformation: Originally, the Court was based on a classic international law model of court organisation and decision-making. Gradually, the concern for the effectiveness of EU law led to the reinvention of its procedural and organisational design. The role of the judge was reconceived as that of a neutral expert, an inner circle of participants emerged and the Court became more hierarchical. While these developments have enabled the Court to make EU law uniquely effective, they have also created problems from a democratic perspective. The book argues that it is time to democratise the Court and shows ways to do this.
Chapter 5 investigates the availability of external review under the new economic governance of the Eurozone. It shows that the transformation of the EU’s powers in the economic and fiscal fields have not come together with a parallel intensification of judicial scrutiny by the Court of Justice. It also finds that, considering the Court’s current case law and the conceptual frameworks that continue to structure its action (starting with the concepts of challengeable act and legal effects or the rules on standing) a shift in approach is quite unlikely. The result is a profound disconnect between the evolving nature of law and governance in the realm of EU economic policy and its judicial apprehension by the Court of Justice, an inappropriate level of review and a widening accountability gap. It notes that several bodies have sought to instil a certain dose of review, without compensating the lack of judicial review however. It enjoins the Court to lift the constitutional uncertainty produced by the new economic governance of the Eurozone, to come to terms with what standard economic governance has progressively become and to make sure that supranational judicial scrutiny keeps up with the evolving powers of the EU.
The chapter deals with the assignment of cases to reporting judges and judicial formations at ECJ. EU lawyers generally consider the ECJ’s system of case assignment to be one of the most problematic features in the court’s decision-making process. They perceive a strong tension with the right to a fair trial. The aim of this chapter is to understand why the court maintains a system that has been under severe attack for a long time. By closely analysing the practice of case assignment between 2003 and 2019, charting assignment profiles of individual judges, the chapter argues that the ECJ’s assignment system is a key mechanism for the court’s institutional success. It has allowed the court to maintain a sense of common purpose, a strong and persistent idea of its mandate as a guardian of the effectiveness and primacy of EU law. The chapter identifies three key functions case assignment performs. First, supporting jurisprudential stability and continuity by creating an elite group of judges who writes the bulk of the most important ECJ decisions. Second, integrating new ECJ judges through gradually assigning them more difficult cases thereby structuring a learning process for becoming a full-fledged ECJ judge. And third, the ECJ’s system of case assignment has helped to maintain what is generally lost in courts of the ECJ’s size: a place where all twenty-seven ECJ judges and eleven Advocates General are informed on all incoming cases, jointly engage in systematizing the ECJ’s case law and framing the court’s agenda.
The chapter focuses on the judicial mobilisation of the trade unions before the European Court of Justice in the well-known Viking and Laval cases. It asks how to use the personal archives of the EU lawyers to better understand litigation strategies, by analysing the digital archives (emails and attachments) of a trade union lawyer from the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) involved in the mobilisation. Firstly, the chapter discusses the analytical benefits and methodological problems raised by this rare kind of empirical material that brings new qualitative insights on the practices of the litigants behind the official scene. Especially, this material asks ethical and legal questions around confidentiality and privacy that should be addressed. Secondly, thanks to these digital archives, the author brought a new understanding of the issues at stake in the Viking and Laval cases, by focusing on two examples: the judicial lobbying of the Swedish trade unions in the Laval case, and the role of the trade union legal experts in framing the legal and political issues of the two affairs.
Newspapers as the main media of political coverage continue to be primary outlets for reports and opinions on collectively binding decisions. Following a quantitative research strategy, this chapter introduces a new methodological approach that allows us to systematically capture media attention and public salience of court decisions. It provides insight into a new dataset for newspaper coverage of more than 4,000 CJEU decisions in eight EU quality newspapers. The chapter describes the data collection process, the structure of the data, and the opportunities for quantitative analysis. Moreover, it emphasizes the general applicability of this methodological approach for a large number of court cases across a longer time period. The collected data offers new insights into media attention to CJEU cases and various opportunities for future analysis. The contribution also reflects on limitations, strengths, and weaknesses of this quantitative approach of studying the CJEU, compared to other approaches presented in the volume.
The judgment rendered by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on May 27, 2019, deemed Germany’s prosecution service (Staatsanwaltschaft) legally incompetent for the purpose of issuing European arrest warrants (EAW) due to its lack of institutional independence. As a consequence, the question of how the German criminal prosecution system differs from the approaches taken by other European countries issuing European arrest warrants arises and raises the question of whether the German prosecution service truly is insufficiently independent in this respect. Debates amongst legal scholars have ensued in the wake of the CJEU’s judgment—the Court not yet having proffered any solutions regarding the re-establishment of the institutional independence—and this article shall discuss the lack of independence and acquaint the reader with possible solutions.
What is the EU for? In light of the current state of European integration, EU law cannot meaningfully be appreciated without understanding the political, social and cultural context within which it operates. This textbook proposes a fresh, accessible and interdisciplinary take on the subject that is suitable for one-semester and introductory courses wishing to engage the reader with the wider context of the EU project. It situates the institutions, legal order and central policy domains of the EU in their context and offer students the tools to critically analyse and reflect on European integration and its consequences. With pedagogical features such as further reading, class questions and essay/exams questions to support learning, this textbook enables students to form their own informed opinion on whether the EU offers an appropriate answer to the many questions that it is asked.
Chapter 2 sets the descriptive, theoretical, and methodological stage for revisiting the behavior of national courts in the process of European integration. It describes the central institutional mechanism through which national courts can partner with the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to apply European law, exercise de facto judicial review, and promote integration: the “preliminary reference procedure.” It summarizes how national courts’ use of this procedure has been theorized by the prevailing account of the judicial construction of Europe: the “judicial empowerment thesis.” And it highlights suggestive qualitative and quantitative evidence that this thesis may conceal as much as it reveals. The chapter concludes by outlining the fieldwork strategy deployed to revisit the judicial empowerment thesis in Chapters 3 and 4 and probe whether national judges have harbored more diffuse and persistent resistances to European law, the ECJ, and institutional change than has hitherto been acknowledged.
International organisations are inherently purposive actors within the international legal system, created and empowered by States to pursue finite common objectives. This teleological dimension has come to play a prominent role in the way in which international law rationalises international organisations, with their purposes given a significant, often determinative, role in delimiting their competences. This article argues that this is the product of a conscious shift in legal reasoning that took place in the aftermath of World War II. Through an analysis of a series of key post-War decisions, it identifies the common features of this ‘teleological turn’ and, disentangling it from other forms of legal reasoning, examines its unique underlying logic and normative claims. It demonstrates that while the teleological turn offers prospects for the systemic development of international governance, an increasingly abstract approach to the concept and identification of an organisation's ‘purpose’ raises a number of unresolved questions which cast a shadow of indeterminacy over the law of international organisations.