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Suárez holds a voluntarist conception of obligation, in so far as he takes obligation to depend essentially on the will of a superior, and, in the case of the natural law, on the will of God. Suárez accepts a voluntarist thesis about law. In his view, the character of a law consists partly in a command, and the natural law is a genuine law, measured by this criterion. According to Finnis, Suárez's voluntarist conception of obligation does not fit everything that Suárez wants to say about obligation. Suárez recognizes duties without obligations, because he sees that the expression of will introduces a distinct type of moral relation that is not reducible to a simple duty. He marks this distinct type of moral relation by speaking of 'obligation'. Finnis draws his evidence for Suárez's view of obligation from the treatment of obligation.
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