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28 results

Page 1 of 2

Resistance to Evidence
  • Mona Simion
  • Coming soon
  • Expected online publication date:
    March 2024
    Print publication:
    31 March 2024
  • We have increasingly sophisticated ways of acquiring and communicating knowledge, but efforts to spread this knowledge often encounter resistance to evidence. The phenomenon of resistance to evidence, while subject to thorough investigation in social psychology, is acutely under-theorized in the philosophical literature. Mona Simion's book is concerned with positive epistemology: it argues that we have epistemic obligations to update and form beliefs on available and undefeated evidence. In turn, one's resistance to easily available evidence is unpacked as an instance of epistemic malfunctioning. Simion develops a full positive, integrated epistemological picture, in conjunction with novel accounts of evidence, defeat, norms of inquiry, and permissible suspension, and disinformation. Her book is relevant for anyone with an interest in the nature of evidence and justified belief, and in the best ways to avoid the high-stakes practical consequences of evidence resistance in policy and practice.

  • Knowledge and Disinformation

  • Mona Simion
  • Journal:
    Episteme , First View
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    29 June 2023, pp. 1-12
    • Article
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  • This paper develops a novel account of the nature of disinformation that challenges several widely spread theoretical assumptions, such as that disinformation is a species of information, a species of misinformation, essentially false or misleading, essentially intended/aimed/having the function of generating false beliefs in/misleading hearers. The paper defends a view of disinformation as ignorance generating content: on this account, X is disinformation in a context C iff X is a content unit communicated at C that has a disposition to generate ignorance at C in normal conditions. I also offer a taxonomy of disinformation, and a view of what it is for a signal to constitute disinformation for a particular agent in a particular context. The account, if correct, carries high stakes upshots, both theoretically and practically: disinformation tracking will need to go well beyond mere fact checking.

  • Chapter 8 - KRA and Epistemic Contextualism

  • from Part III - Knowledge and Language
  • Christoph Kelp, University of Glasgow, Mona Simion, University of Glasgow
  • Book:
    Sharing Knowledge
    Published online:
    18 November 2021
    Print publication:
    18 November 2021, pp 159-176

  • Summary

    Chapter 8 takes a closer look at the relation between the knowledge rule of assertion and the divide between contextualist and invariantist semantics for knowledge attributions. We argue that DeRose’s influential argument that the knowledge rule of assertion demands contextualism fails and show how it can be turned on its head.

  • Chapter 5 - FFAA and KRA

  • from Part II - FFAA
  • Christoph Kelp, University of Glasgow, Mona Simion, University of Glasgow
  • Book:
    Sharing Knowledge
    Published online:
    18 November 2021
    Print publication:
    18 November 2021, pp 98-117

  • Summary

    Chapter 5 fits the knowledge rule of assertion into the functionalist picture. We ask the question of why assertion should be governed by the knowledge rule, look at some proposals from the rule first camp, due, respectively, to Bach and Hindriks on the one hand and Douven on the other, and show that they remain unsatisfactory. We then offer a functionalist account of the status of the knowledge rule of assertion as well as a functionalist rationale for it.

  • Chapter 3 - KRA and Sufficiency

  • from Part I - KRA
  • Christoph Kelp, University of Glasgow, Mona Simion, University of Glasgow
  • Book:
    Sharing Knowledge
    Published online:
    18 November 2021
    Print publication:
    18 November 2021, pp 51-70

  • Summary

    The vast majority of the literature on the knowledge rule of assertion focuses on the claim that knowledge is necessary for permissible assertion. Chapter 3 turns to the thesis that knowledge is sufficient for permissible assertion and defends it against recent objections by Jessica Brown and Jennifer Lackey.

Sharing Knowledge
  • A Functionalist Account of Assertion
  • Christoph Kelp, Mona Simion
  • Published online:
    18 November 2021
    Print publication:
    18 November 2021
  • Assertion is the central vehicle for the sharing of knowledge. Whether knowledge is shared successfully often depends on the quality of assertions: good assertions lead to successful knowledge sharing, while bad ones don't. In Sharing Knowledge, Christoph Kelp and Mona Simion investigate the relation between knowledge sharing and assertion, and develop an account of what it is to assert well. More specifically, they argue that the function of assertion is to share knowledge with others. It is this function that supports a central norm of assertion according to which a good assertion is one that has the disposition to generate knowledge in others. The book uses this functionalist approach to motivate further norms of assertion on both the speaker and the hearer side and investigates ramifications of this view for other questions about assertion.

  • Chapter 2 - Problems for KRA

  • from Part I - KRA
  • Christoph Kelp, University of Glasgow, Mona Simion, University of Glasgow
  • Book:
    Sharing Knowledge
    Published online:
    18 November 2021
    Print publication:
    18 November 2021, pp 30-50

  • Summary

    Chapter 2 discusses a number of classical problems for the knowledge rule of assertion and argues that these problems can be solved. Worth special notice here is a general normative framework with accounts of criticisability, blamelessness and blameworthiness that we develop. Applied to the case of assertion, this framework allows us to give a well-motivated and knowledge-rule-friendly response to some classical cases that are often thought to show that the knowledge rule of assertion is too strong.

  • Chapter 1 - The Case for the KRA

  • from Part I - KRA
  • Christoph Kelp, University of Glasgow, Mona Simion, University of Glasgow
  • Book:
    Sharing Knowledge
    Published online:
    18 November 2021
    Print publication:
    18 November 2021, pp 11-29

  • Summary

    According to the knowledge rule of assertion, one must assert that p only if one knows that p. Chapter 1 mounts a case for the knowledge rule of assertion. It surveys relevant evidence for it in the literature and develops a couple of additions that serve to strengthen the case for the knowledge rule of assertion.

  • Chapter 6 - FFAA and the Duty to Believe

  • from Part II - FFAA
  • Christoph Kelp, University of Glasgow, Mona Simion, University of Glasgow
  • Book:
    Sharing Knowledge
    Published online:
    18 November 2021
    Print publication:
    18 November 2021, pp 118-136

  • Summary

    Chapter 6 turns to rules of assertion on the hearer side. One of the central aims of this chapter is to argue for one specific such rule which requires hearers believe what is asserted. We argue that in order to make proper sense of testimonial injustice, we must countenance a duty to believe on the part of the hearer. Having looked at some proposals that emerge from recent literature on conversational pressure and found them wanting, we offer a functionalist account of this duty to belief.

  • Chapter 7 - KRA and Constitutivity

  • from Part III - Knowledge and Language
  • Christoph Kelp, University of Glasgow, Mona Simion, University of Glasgow
  • Book:
    Sharing Knowledge
    Published online:
    18 November 2021
    Print publication:
    18 November 2021, pp 139-158

  • Summary

    Chapter 7 considers the question of whether the knowledge rule of assertion is a constitutive rule of assertion in the same way in which rules of games and languages are constitutive, and defends a negative answer.

Page 1 of 2