At nearly 170 million inhabitants, Nigeria is Africa's most populous country by twofold and fertility levels remain higher than most other sub-Saharan African nations. Throughout the last several decades, the fertility gap between Christians and Muslims has widened with significant political implications for a nascent democracy. Where the Demographic Health Survey (DHS) survey of 1990 revealed a non-significant difference of 0·3 children, this figure had increased to 2·3 children by 2013. As the total fertility rate (TFR) of Christians decreased significantly from 6·1 to 4·5 children per woman between 1990 and 2013, the TFR of Muslims increased from 6·4 to 6·8 children per woman. The timing of this divergence coincides with the formal institutionalization of Sharia law in 1999. We examine the role of religion on education, contraception and family behaviour. Finally, we touch upon the implications for population growth and the religious composition of Nigeria in the coming decades.

Kenya's March 2013 elections ushered in a popular system of devolved government that represented the country's biggest political transformation since independence. Yet within months there were public calls for a referendum to significantly revise the new arrangements. This article analyses the campaign that was led by the newly elected governors in order to understand the ongoing disputes over the introduction of decentralisation in Kenya, and what they tell us about the potential for devolution to check the power of central government and to diffuse political and ethnic tensions. Drawing on Putnam's theory of two-level games, we suggest that Kenya's new governors have proved willing and capable of acting in concert to protect their own positions because the pressure that governors are placed under at the local level to defend county interests has made it politically dangerous for them to be co-opted by the centre. As a result, the Kenyan experience cannot be read as a case of ‘recentralisation’ by the national government, or as one of the capture of sub-national units by ‘local elites’ or ‘notables’. Rather, decentralisation in Kenya has generated a political system with a more robust set of checks and balances, but at the expense of fostering a new set of local controversies that have the potential to exacerbate corruption and fuel local ethnic tensions in some parts of the country.

Why did the Ghanaian state go to such extraordinary lengths to facilitate the reliable broadcast of the World Cup in 2014? During a period of frequent power outages, Ghana swapped power with regional neighbours and directed major domestic industries to reduce production in order to allow Ghanaians to watch their national soccer team compete in the World Cup. This paper investigates the politics of the public service provision of electricity in Ghana. We focus on the short-term crisis during the 2014 World Cup to reveal the citizens' and politicians' expectations about electricity as a public good. Drawing on an analysis of archival documents, Ghanaian newspapers, and interviews with government, business, and NGO officials in the energy sector, we argue that the Ghanaian state historically has created the expectation of electricity as a right of national citizenship and explore how this intersects with competitive party politics today.

In this article, I map out spaces of social encounters and elaborate upon the once openly exposed but now hidden nightlife of Butembo, in eastern Congo. I explore what moves the people of Butembo, where they go to have fun, and what ‘fun’ means in a war-torn place. The main focus lies on the city's countless cabarets, as these seemed the places where people mostly met. A cabaret is a private dwelling where a single woman offers home-brewed alcohol and sexual services alike. Usually, a cabaret bears no signage at all, so from the outside, it is hard to discern from an ordinary house. Yet, their sheer invisibility stands in sharp contrast to their major importance. As I proceed through the article, it becomes clear that these obscure cabarets are spaces of sociability with an undeniable importance that contribute to the functioning of the city in many respects.

This article unravels the world of ethnic associations in Katanga that emerged as a result of rural–urban migration. These associations constitute a multi-tier system reflecting ethnic, provincial and national identity levels. Primarily meant to organise mutual aid and foster cultural values, they have behaved as interest groups since democracy was re-established in the 1990s. Representing ethnic communities, they try to influence the distribution of spoils through lobbying activities, emphasising the right of ‘autochthons’ to be prioritised regarding employment and development. Political and socio-economic changes trigger identity shifts and ethnic associations adapt by inventing alternative ‘autochthony’/‘allochthony’ dichotomies, causing friction between communities. The multi-tier system provides forums where ethnic differences can be negotiated and ethnic communities can integrate. In its current manner of functioning it is only effective at mitigating acute crises. In order to resolve more complex political issues, it would benefit from a preventive approach within a permanent framework of consultation between associations and authorities.

Old Fadama in Accra, Ghana, is a vast informal settlement. A legalistic approach by successive governments has meant a near-absence of statutory institutions and the emergence of alternative public authorities. These endeavour to provide the area with a range of basic public services to solve the area's serious developmental challenges. Through processes of informal negotiation residents establish rights and social contracts that underpin and define what will constitute ideas of state and law. At the same time, self-governance emerges while relations with statutory institutions shift back and forth between vilification, tacit acceptance, and productive cooperation. The article contributes to studies of governance in informal urban settlements on two fronts. First, it shows how informal arrangements lead to the provision of basic public services and influence the workings of formal institutions of government. Second, it challenges facile understandings of large-scale informal settlements as generally chaotic, lawless or subversive.

It is often assumed that political parties in Africa have only weak formal structures and are instead dominated by informal, personalised networks. This paper seeks to challenge this view by presenting a much more nuanced picture of intra-party dynamics. Based on unique survey data from Ghana, it is shown how formal and informal party structures co-exist and interact at the national and constituency level. Because informal relationships are not directly observable and difficult to study, the paper employs a social network approach to map the personal interactions between the Members of the 6th Parliament of Ghana and their respective parties. It is found that the local party organisation plays a strong role in both of the major parties NDC (National Democratic Congress) and NPP (New Patriotic Party). There are, however, also differences between the parties. At the national level, the NDC is strongly centralised and dominated by its national executives. The NPP, in contrast, has an informal power center located in the Ashanti Region. Ethno-regional factions play only a minor role in both parties. By demonstrating that the relative importance of informal relations varies even between parties in the same country, the paper contributes to a better understanding of the variation in party organisation across Africa.

Transnational medical research has become a common feature in many parts of Africa. This paper explores the contribution such activity makes to the social and economic lives of those involved, including both trial subjects and local staff. By considering the value of the ‘exposure’ that involvement brings to staff and research participants, we reflect on the conversion of scientific knowledge into practical knowledge and its value to sustaining precarious livelihoods in an economically fragile city. We consider the interplay between science and sociality and argue for a need to take seriously the circulation of scientific knowledge beyond the confines of expert spaces.

This study assesses the capabilities of business associations for conducting meaningful policy engagements with government. Using information from 21 associations and five state institutions, this work investigates the level of autonomy and ability of business associations to coordinate and order their interests for policy decision-making. Findings reveal that the ability to organise an association's own interests is hindered by weak systems and internal structures, especially at sub-sector level. Most associations are financially weak, have limited professional expertise and experience a low level of commitment from members, which affects their capacity for autonomy. It is important that business associations create regulations to make membership ties binding, so as to strengthen their influence on policy. Associations should also be more aggressive in mobilising finances, and they should identify synergies and develop partnerships with the state to build their capacity for participating in policy-making.

Drawing on empirical evidence from Yei River County in South Sudan, this paper argues that, rather than a temporary phenomenon, displacement may lead to a drastic reorganisation of land occupation and governance. Such reorganisation may become strongly connected to broader political contention. In the case of Yei, existing legal frameworks and institutions are inadequate to deal with land conflicts resulting from massive displacement and return. Crucially, historical grievances result in the displaced no longer being perceived as powerless victims, but as agents of a Dinka agenda to (re)occupy territories in Equatoria, and as perpetrators in land conflict. Such politics of land-control and identity may turn land disputes between displaced people and returnees into a major source of instability. At the same time, those displaced people who are not well-connected politically may lose their land rights.

The increase in crime and violence committed by young men known as lonetia in southern Karamoja, Uganda, has occurred in parallel to overall security improvements since the start of the 2006 disarmament campaign. This article examines the lonetia phenomenon from the perspective of the young men themselves. Panel data from four sets of interviews conducted in 2013 with approximately 400 young men provide details on the motivations of young men and the challenges they experience in the face of changing livelihood opportunities. We find that the lonetia category is highly fluid and that a set of behaviours and attributes correspond with the frequency of engagement in lonetia activity. Examination of seasonality highlights the contribution of hunger to lonetia frequency. We examine the perceptions of power and respect of young men in their communities as well as their propensity towards violence. The article concludes with thoughts on influencing lonetia involvement.

Since mid-December 2013, thousands of people have been killed in armed conflict in South Sudan. The fighting is entrenched in a power struggle between the main political contenders ahead of elections which were scheduled for 2015. This article examines the violence in South Sudan since the North–South war ended with a focus on the consequences of the introduction of electoral politics. Our research contributes to the literature on state-building and peace-building in war-torn societies, by exploring how the extreme levels of violence are linked to three groups of factors. First, the stakes involved in being part of the government are extremely high, since it is the only way to secure political and economic influence. Second, the actors involved in political life are dominated by individuals who held positions within the rebel groups, which increases the risk of political differences turning violent. Third, the institutions important for a legitimate electoral process, and which work to prevent violence, are weak or non-existent.

South Sudan is in a unique combination of (post)-conflict reconstruction and the birth of a new state in which old policies are re-activated and new policies introduced. By looking at three case-studies of taxation and private sector regulation reforms, the paper will show how the overlapping and often contradictory regulatory frameworks of the state provide the setting for bricolage strategies by different actors. These actors, and particularly state officials, rely on a variety of institutional resources to implement, resist or remake certain regulatory measures. Although the breadth of regulatory measures has increased exponentially, the institutional corridor – the space in which bricolage is performed and on which various actors can rely – remains narrow. This space is contingent on wartime authority structures, and more particularly pre-existing Sudan's People Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M) power structures, as well as a deep-rooted resistance to centralised control. Importantly, these regulatory practices are not fixed: intense periods of rearrangement of the social order or ‘open moments’ may provide a window of opportunity for regulatory reform.

The transformation of the South African Public Service into a bureaucracy that is broadly representative of the population is one of the most significant public sector reforms to occur since the end of apartheid. Grounded in the theory of representative bureaucracy, this study examines demographic representation in the South African Public Service and how it impacts the organisational effectiveness of national departments. The empirical analysis is based on longitudinal data from 60 national departments from 2006 to 2013. The findings show that as these organisations become more representative by hiring a higher per cent of Africans, of Coloureds, and of Indians, they achieve a higher per cent of goals. The findings for gender representation are more mixed and show that female representation among most racial groups is unrelated to organisational effectiveness.

This article examines the relationship between the politics of ethnicity and road construction in Hawassa, Ethiopia. The Ethiopian state has recently invested unprecedented amounts of money in the construction of urban roads. These roads both undermine and reinforce longstanding ethnic hierarchies within Ethiopian cities. Contrary to the image promoted by the state of harmony among residents of different ethnic backgrounds, our research revealed a great deal of tension, particularly concerning the distribution of benefits from state-led infrastructural development. The experiences of residents in rapidly changing neighbourhoods, demonstrate that the benefits of recent road construction are not necessarily distributed according to the policies of the current regime. Instead, historical inequalities interact with contemporary urban development in ways that may actually disrupt the state's vision of unity through diversity. Stratification is built into the city and attempts to reshape the city necessarily interact with recent and long-standing inequalities.

Today, a majority of citizens of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, participate in suburban and exurban growth and development much like urbanites throughout the world. Unlike the garden suburbs of North America or Europe, Dar es Salaam's suburban residents often engage in multiple income-generating activities, the most common and conspicuous of which are cultivation and animal husbandry. The presence of urban farming has suggested that Dar es Salaam's residents represent peasants incrementally transitioning to urban life. This article however, contends that everything from the varieties of cultivation, access to land and water, to the definition of what it means to be a farmer is shaped by decentralised private interests controlling access to land and resources in suburban neighbourhoods. The varieties of cultivation and animal husbandry instead reflect socioeconomic class distinctions emerging from a new suburban political economy, enabling a clearer perspective on the prospects of cultivators as these suburban districts transform.

Across African democracies, maintaining popular trust in electoral management bodies (EMBs) is vital to enhancing election integrity and, ultimately, regime legitimacy. However, scholars have largely sidestepped any systematic analysis of how citizens formulate their attitudes towards EMBs and how these attitudes vary over time. To address these gaps in the literature, we focus on Kenyan EMBs, which have experienced fluctuating popular support since the ruinous 2007 elections and subsequent institutional reforms. Using primary election reports and original survey and focus group data, we analyse the sources of Kenyans' trust in EMBs from 1992 onward and probe the 2013 election period deeply. Across time, we find that confidence in EMBs usually collapses after polarised elections, due to perceived problems with the EMB's autonomy and capacity. Following the 2013 elections, Kenyans were also more likely to lose confidence in the EMB if they were affiliated with losing presidential candidates or if they were critical of EMB performance.

In Liberia, women's advocacy has been crucial in bringing peace after 14 years of conflict as well as in electing Africa's first female president. While the accomplishments of the women's movement have been widely praised, some authors have suggested that the once vibrant movement is crumbling. In this article we claim that one of the most important challenges for the Liberian women's movement comes precisely from its internationally proclaimed success, provoking four related outcomes: First, different women's organisations compete for the credit of the success story; second, the national government has tried to appropriate the movement and integrate it into governmental structures; third, the relationship between the movement and its international partners has evolved towards mutual disappointment due to a lack of sustainable funding and unmet expectations; and fourth, the movement seems stuck in the peacemaker label and unable to redefine itself to engage in new battles as international aid diminishes.

Under what circumstances can non-state actors become successful local peacemakers? A growing body of research documents the involvement of non-state actors in local conflict resolution in Africa. However, there is large variation in such actors' power, legitimacy, and ultimately their ability to contribute to conflict resolution. The ways in which contextual and dynamic factors at local and national levels, and in particular the relationship between non-state and state actors and institutions, affect local conflict resolution are not sufficiently understood. To address this gap, this paper analyses the peace process addressing a long-standing conflict in Kerio Valley, Kenya. The analysis illustrates how the failure of the state to provide security and basic services led non-state actors to fill important roles in governance. Through this process, they were endowed with legitimacy and power which enabled them to play key roles in a peace process that led to a mutually acceptable peace agreement.

Are South African chiefs rural and peri-urban despots or have they transformed to legitimate representatives of local interests in the post-apartheid era? This article argues that the legitimacy of chieftaincy in KwaZulu-Natal is not only based on constitutional and legal recognition, but that chieftaincy may rely on different forms of ‘basic legitimacy’. Chieftaincy is neither despotic nor civil but occupies an intermediary position between local citizens and the state. This junction position provides chiefs with specific opportunities to gain power but also requires a navigation between cooperation and conflict in the relationship with the ANC and the state.