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Consciousness is already solved: The continued debate is not about science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 March 2022

Michael S. A. Graziano Open the ORCID record for Michael S. A. Graziano [Opens in a new window]
Michael S. A. Graziano*
Affiliation:
Princeton Neuroscience Institute, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ08544, USA. Graziano@princeton.eduhttps://grazianolab.princeton.edu/
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Abstract

A logical explanation of consciousness has been known for decades. The brain must construct a specific set of information about conscious feeling (theory-of-mind information), causing people to believe, think, and claim to have consciousness. Theories that propose an actual, intangible feeling are non-explanatory. They add a magical red herring while leaving unexplained the objective phenomena: the believing, thinking, and claiming.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 45 , 2022 , e50
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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