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Moral foundations are not moral propositions
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 September 2019
Abstract
Joshua May responds to skepticism about moral knowledge via appeal to empirical work on moral foundations. I demonstrate that the moral foundations literature is not able to do the work May needs. It demonstrates shared moral cognition, not shared moral judgment, and therefore, May's attempt to defeat general skepticism fails.
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- Open Peer Commentary
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- Copyright
- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019
Target article
Précis of Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind
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