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Networks, intentionality and multiple realizability: Not enough to block reductionism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Markus I. Eronen  and
Laura F. Bringmann
Markus I. Eronen
Affiliation:
Department of Theory and History of Psychology, University of Groningen, 9712 TS Groningen, The Netherlandsm.i.eronen@rug.nlhttp://www.markuseronen.comhttps://www.rug.nl/staff/m.i.eronen/
Laura F. Bringmann
Affiliation:
Department of Psychometrics and Statistics, University of Groningen, 9712 TS Groningen, The Netherlands. l.f.bringmann@rug.nlhttps://www.rug.nl/staff/l.f.bringmann/
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Abstract

Borsboom et al. propose that the network approach blocks reductionism in psychopathology. We argue that the two main arguments, intentionality and multiple realizability of mental disorders, are not sufficient to establish that mental disorders are not brain disorders, and that the specific role of networks in these arguments is unclear.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 42 , 2019 , e8
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019 

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