Global fossil fuel subsidies are substantial and contribute to climate change. They also undermine the ambitions of the Paris Agreement. However, under the WTO, the international community's foremost economic institution, it is renewable energy subsidies, not fossil fuel subsidies, that have been subjected to litigation. To date, no fossil fuel subsidy has ever been brought before the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). This paper makes a unique contribution to the literature on energy subsidies by applying the WTO covered Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (1994) (SCM Agreement) to a specific government measure designed to support the coal export industry in Australia: namely, the proposed concessional loan for the construction of a rail line between the Carmichael coal mine and Abbot Point coal port by the Northern Australia Infrastructure Facility (NAIF). In finding that this measure is in breach of the SCM Agreement, this paper foreshadows future litigation and provides guidance to non-government organizations (NGOs) seeking to identify other unlawful fossil fuel subsidies.

The renegotiation of what US President Trump called ‘the worst trade deal ever’ has resulted in the most detailed environmental chapter in any trade agreement in history. The USMCA mentions dozens of environmental issues that its predecessor, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), overlooked, and in line with contemporary US practice, brings the vast majority of environmental provisions into the core of the agreement, and subjects these provisions to a sanction-based dispute settlement mechanism. It also jettisons two controversial NAFTA measures potentially harmful to the environment. However, this paper argues that the USMCA only makes limited contributions to environmental protection. It primarily replicates most of the environmental provisions included in recent agreements, and only introduces three unprecedented environmental provisions. Moreover, it avoids important issues such as climate change, it does not mention the precautionary principle, and it scales back some environmental provisions related to multilateral environmental agreements.

In March 2018, the United States enacted tariff increases on a vast range of imported steel and aluminum products. The Trump administration cited national security concerns as the justification, claiming an exception under GATT Article XXI. In response to these tariffs, several WTO Members, including the European Union, Canada, Mexico, China, Russia, and Turkey, adopted their own tariffs against imports from the United States, justifying their tariffs under the WTO Agreement on Safeguards. Other Members, such as South Korea, Brazil, and Argentina opted for quota agreements on these exports with the United States in exchange for exemption from the tariffs. This article argues that none of these measures is consistent with WTO rules. The sweeping tariffs that the United States have adopted, the retaliatory measures that several Members have implemented, and the bilateral quota agreements that three Members concluded with the United States are indeed ‘three wrongs’ that do not make a right, but rather endanger the stability of the international trading system under WTO legal disciplines.

The EU–Fatty Alcohols decision of the Appellate Body addressed an important issue of the scope of permissible adjustments under Article 2.4 of the Agreement on Interpretation of Article VI of the GATT 1994, focusing on the ‘mark-up’ paid by an Indonesian exporter to a related company as a difference affecting price comparability between the export price and the normal value. The Appellate Body confirmed that the primary focus of the investigating authority's assessment is on whether the relationship between related companies can be demonstrated to be a factor that impacts the prices of the relevant transactions. This case raises the question of whether a harmonized approach to transfer pricing across different regulatory areas would be useful to bring greater consistency of treatment and certainty to international transactions.

It is a truth universally acknowledged that every ambitious twenty-first century trade agreement is in want of a chapter on electronic commerce. One of the most politically sensitive and technically challenging issues is personal privacy, including cross-border transfer of information by electronic means, use and location of computing facilities, and personal information protection. States are learning to solve the problem of state responsibility for something that does not respect their borders while still allowing twenty-first century commerce to develop. A comparison of the Canada–European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) allows us to see the evolution of the issues thought necessary for an e-commerce chapter, since both include Canada, and to see the differing priorities of the US and the EU, since they are each signatory to one of the agreements, but not of the other. I conclude by seeking generalizations about why we see a mix of aspirational and obligatory provisions in free trade agreements. I suggest that the reasons are that governments are learning how to work with each other in a new domain, and learning about the trade implications of these issues.

Since 2017, the United States (US) and other World Trade Organization (WTO) members have been violating their legal duties and democratic mandates given by national parliaments to maintain the WTO Appellate Body (AB) as legally prescribed in Article 17 of the WTO Dispute Understanding (DSU). Article 17 defines the AB as being ‘composed of seven persons’, with vacancies being ‘filled as they arise’. Sections 2 and 3 explain why none of the reasons offered by the US for its blocking of the (re)appointment of AB candidates – on grounds unrelated to the personal qualifications of the candidates – can justify the illegal disruptions of the WTO legal and dispute settlement system. EU trade diplomats must exercise leadership using the existing legal powers and duties of the WTO Ministerial Conference and General Council under Article IX WTO – if necessary, based on ‘a majority of the votes cast’ – to complete the WTO selection procedures for filling AB vacancies and protect the AB as legally defined in Article 17 DSU. Sections 4 and 5 explain why the competition, social policy, and rule-of-law principles underlying European ‘ordo-liberalism’ offer coherent strategies for overcoming the WTO governance crises by limiting hegemonic abuses of both US neo-liberalism and Chinese state-capitalism.

Scholars and policymakers have long debated whether the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) enhances development through increased trade – i.e., whether the program is effective as a form of ‘trade-as-aid’. We argue that, by itself, GSP increases poor-country exports, but that when recipients join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) or its successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO), they realize fewer imports, and less gains in total trade, than GSP recipients that do not join the multilateral trading system. The logic is that GATT/WTO membership makes GSP more predictable by making it non-discriminatory, in the sense that exporters in recipient countries are less vulnerable to the program's ad hoc conditionality. This leads these exporters to lobby less against domestic protectionism, yielding higher trade barriers at home, and thus fewer imports. We test this hypothesis using a gravity model of trade, and data on all GSP programs, and find strong support for the argument that the GATT/WTO's interaction with GSP undermines trade.

The e-commerce chapters in South Korea's Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) cover a wide range of issues, ranging from non-discrimination to electronic signatures. Across the agreements, the country's provisions on consumer protection, paperless trading, and data protection are uniquely consistent, while those on other issues are not. With the aid of a framework (Framer v. Follower) that captures the dynamics of bilateral negotiations, this paper argues that in Korea's case, the more consistent a particular set of provisions is portfolio-wide, the more likely it was for Korea to have prioritized the relevant issue and actively pushed its preferred terms in the FTAs.

In April 2017, a WTO panel ruled that China's anti-dumping investigation into imports of dissolving cellulose pulp from Canada violated the WTO's Anti-dumping Agreement. The panel found that China's description of the parallel price trends of dumped imports and domestic products failed to explain their finding that the dumped imports caused the decline in domestic prices. The ruling perhaps should not have surprised anyone as the WTO had made similar findings in disputes involving two previous Chinese anti-dumping investigations. This paper explores to what degree ‘parallel price trends’ can be used as a valid methodology to determine price depression, and whether it is the methodology itself that is problematic or China's implementation of that methodology that has caused it to lose three disputes over the past five years.

Technology is transforming global trade. The global trading system, however, has struggled to keep up with changes in technology. One of the major challenges for the trading system is that the issues raised by digitally enabled commerce are largely regulatory in nature. The issues that are at the forefront of digital trade increasingly relate to citizens’ most fundamental interactions, including speech, finance, energy, and transportation. This paper argues that resolving these international regulatory issues will require reforming the approach that has been taken to global trade negotiations. International discussions around the most challenging issues in the digital economy ought to move away from the ‘horse-trading’ nature of traditional trade negotiations and towards a strategy focused on regulatory cooperation. Failure to achieve regulatory cooperation could further fragment digital services based upon national borders. The Internet has the potential to positively impact the global economy precisely because it is global, decentralized, and bottom-up in nature. International policymaking through regulatory cooperation can maintain those principles, while protecting fundamental national concerns such as stability, privacy, and security.

On 11 October 2017, an ad hoc tribunal seated in Geneva and chaired by Professor Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, with co-arbitrators Gary Born (Claimants' appointee, dissenting) and Judge Peter Tomka (Respondent's appointee), issued its award in Jürgen Wirtgen & others v. The Czech Republic (the Award). The Tribunal dismissed the Claimants' claims in full and ordered the Parties to bear their own legal costs and expenses.

The WTO Appellate Body report United States – Certain Methodologies and Their Application to Anti-Dumping Proceedings Involving China is yet another in a long line of disputes involving US Department of Commerce's dumping margin calculation methodologies. The AB ruled against the United States on three important aspects: (1) the use of the Nails test to rationalize the exceptional method in Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement so as to justify using the weighted average-to-transaction methodology in dumping margin calculations; (2) the treatment of multiple companies in a non-market economy as a single NME-wide entity; and (3) the USDOC's policy of using adverse facts available for such an entity. Yet, some aspects of the AB's decision – most notably affirming the use of average prices – significantly weaken Article 2.4.2's pattern requirement and potentially open the door to greater use of the exceptional method.

This paper critiques a Panel ruling that was permissive in allowing the EU to exclude China from the renegotiations of several tariff lines of poultry meat and the related allocation of new tariff-rate quotas (TRQs). The EU's basis for exclusion was that China lacked a principal or substantial supplying interest in the modified tariff lines. The Panel's ruling supported China for only two tariff lines in which China eventually served 50% of the EU market after certain SPS measures expired, on the narrow basis that this import increase should have been considered a special factor in the TRQ allocation. The paper argues that the Panel ruled too narrowly by disregarding China's broader claims for a principal or substantial supplying interest. An interpretation consistent with the object and purpose of the GATT supports utilizing a broader set of evidence in China's claim as a principal or substantial supplier for renegotiations of tariff schedules. Allowing nations to use TRQs to prevent emerging markets from achieving a substantial supplying interest is a significant obstacle to the WTO's purpose. The Panel's ruling will be important for future TRQ renegotiations, such as those that would be necessary under Brexit.

The dispute concerns certain market price support measures by China to domestic agricultural producers of wheat, Indica rice, Japonica rice, and corn, which the United States (US) claimed were inconsistent with China's obligations under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. Specifically, the US considered that China utilized market price measures in the period 2012–2015 to support farmer incomes and increase production of the said agricultural products, but that this support was in excess of China's WTO commitments. At the outset, the Panel found that the support measures for Chinese corn producers had expired, and that there were no factors weighing in favor of making findings on this expired measure. So, no findings were made with respect to this claim.

This Article attempts to explore the challenges in situating a multilateral digital trade agreement within the legal framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Section 1 of the article discusses the broad challenges that digitization poses for the international legal framework for trade regulation. I argue first that the traditional classification of products into goods and services under the WTO system is structurally incompatible with the digital economy. I also argue that striking the appropriate balance between trade liberalization and the pursuit of legitimate public policy objectives in a digital trade agreement will be uniquely challenging because certain features that are intrinsic to the digital industry and business strategies of established players in the digital market raise serious anticompetition challenges. A multilateral agreement regulating digital trade needs to acknowledge and address these challenges. Section 2 surveys the efforts that have been undertaken to regulate digital trade as manifested in the WTO Work Program on Electronic Commerce. Acknowledging that the digital trade agenda of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement could be used as a benchmark for discussions on e-commerce at the WTO, I argue that future negotiations for a multilateral digital trade policy will not benefit from using the TPP's digital trade agenda as a benchmark. The TPP does not reconcile systemic tensions between the digital economy and the extant WTO system or address the anticompetition challenges that are unique to the digital ecosystem.