Anyone acquainted with Dr Thomas Szasz's previous writings about mental disorder, the nature of its relationship to the Law and to the problems of drug dependance (Szasz, 1961, 1963, 1970, 1972, 1975) has learned to look in the first instance for the dualism, the poles of which are to be demonstrated as irreconcilable. For, as Glazer (1965) has pointed out, one of Dr Szasz's main conceptual devices is ‘the dichotomy game‘. A phenomenon may belong to category (x) or another category (y) but not to both. As a first step it is as well to examine the definitions of the categories in question. They are liable to prove inconsistent or idiosyncratic or just to be omitted. In other cases, as Professor Stone (1973) has shown in his detailed and telling dissection of the tortuous and confused logic pursued by Dr Szasz in The Myth of Mental Illness, the definitions are incomplete or erroneous and the implied anti-thesis dubious or false. Beginning with the equation that a lie is to a mistake as malingering is to hysteria, Szasz manages, following a maze of tortuous and self-contradictory arguments, to emerge at the conclusion that it would be ‘… more accurate to regard hysteria as a lie than as a mistake‘.