page 107 note 2 In ‘On Worshipping an Embodied God’, Jantzen discusses ‘presence’ only in one paragraph (518). But she refers to her discussion on the subject in ‘Omnipresence and Incorporeality’, which constitutes the bulk of that article (86–91). And her conclusion there emphasizes both my points. She writes, ‘This paper has been designed to show that the notion that an embodied being cannot be everywhere is ambiguous between “His body is not everywhere”, which is true but harmless, and “He is not everywhere” which is not necessarily true unless it is the case that one is present only inside one's own skin’ (90–1). The ‘true but harmless’ alternative (‘His by is not everywhere’) equates ‘embodiment’ with ‘having a body’, whereas the ‘not necessarily true unless’ alternative (‘He is not everywhere’) places the whole burden of her proof on her analysis of ‘presence’.
Another, quite disparate, source of material that Jantzen could have used to strengthen her arguments about omnipresence (one which fits very nicely with Harrison's views about embodiment, incidentally) is the Heideggerian notion of Dasein, thought of a ‘a field of being’. Along such lines, God would be the being ‘spread over a field or region which is the world of its care and concern [i.e., everywhere, for God]…[who] secretly hears his own name called whenever he hears any region of Being named with which he is vitally involved’. ( Barrett, W., Irrational Man [Garden City: Doubleday, 1962], pp. 217, 219Google Scholar, q.v.).
