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The Presence of Evil and the Falsification of Theistic Assertions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2008

William J. Wainwright
William J. Wainwright
Affiliation:
Professor of Philosophy, University of Illinois
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Extract

The falsifiability of theistic assertions no longer appears to be the burning issue it once was, and perhaps this is all to the good. For one thing, it was never entirely clear just what demand was being made of the theist. In this paper I shall not discuss the nature or legitimacy of the falsification requirement as applied to theistic assertions. Instead I shall argue that some of the reasons which have been offered to show that these assertions are not falsifiable are by no means conclusive. Since the most plausible bit of anti-theistic evidence is the existence of evil, it would seem to be legitimate for us to devote our attention to arguments which are designed to show that the theist does not allow the presence of evil to count against his claims.

Type
Research Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 4 , Issue 2 , April 1969 , pp. 213 - 216
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1969

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References

page 214 note 1 Essentially the same point is made by Mitchell, Basil, ‘The Justification of Religious Belief,’ The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 44, 07 1961, pp. 217–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

page 215 note 1 Theism is not the only view which would exclude a situation of this sort. Naturalism might also be falsified if anything of this kind were to occur. The question we are discussing, though, is what would falsify theism, not what would falsify theism and not (some) alternative views. Nonetheless, I am inclined to think that situations may be described approximating these extreme situations—involving perhaps a degree of suffering and a dearth of spirituality not yet reached— which would tend to falsify theism and not naturalism.

page 216 note 1 Very early Christians may have looked forward to an immediate return of Christ and re-worked their beliefs in the face of the fact that He did not return. It is not clear to me, however, that this is an example of a reinterpretation of theism in the face of the presence of evil.