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God, Evil, and the Free Will Defence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2008

James E. Tomberlin  and
Frank McGuinness
James E. Tomberlin
Affiliation:
California State University, Northridge
Frank McGuinness
Affiliation:
California State University, Northridge
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Extract

The Free Will Defence, as we shall understand it here, is an attempt to show that

(1) God exists and he is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good is logically consistent with

(2) There is moral evil in the actual world.

Type
Research Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 13 , Issue 4 , December 1977 , pp. 455 - 475
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1977

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References

page 456 note 1 See his God and Other Minds (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967), pp. 131–55Google Scholar; and ‘Which Worlds Could God Have Created?’, Journal of Philosophy, LXX, 17 (11 October 1973); 539–52.Google Scholar The second of these, we should remark, is considerably different in details from the first, but the basic account remains. It is this basic account which we are concerned with here.

page 457 note 1 See his ‘God and Other Minds’, Noûs, iii, 3 (September 1969), 259–84.Google Scholar Incidentally, we have taken the argument (1)-(8), with minor changes, from Rowe's study.

page 458 note 1 Ibid. p. 277. We have changed the numbering here in order to maintain continuity.

page 458 note 2 Ibid. p. 277.

page 467 note 1 See his ‘Causation’, Journal of Philosophy, LXX, 17 (11 October 1973), 556–67.Google Scholar

page 470 note 1 We invite the reader to compare our remarks here with the much discussed views of Davidson's, Donald ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes‘, Journal of Philosophy 60 (1963), 685–700.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

page 475 note 1 We are grateful to Alvin Plantinga for his generous and instructive comments on an earlier version of this paper. The earliest version of this paper was read at California State University, Northridge, and the present version was read at the University of California, Los Angeles.