Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home

Faith as extended knowledge

  • KEGAN J. SHAW (a1)

Abstract

You don't know that p unless it's on account of your cognitive abilities that you believe truly that p. Virtue epistemologists think there's some such ability constraint on knowledge. This looks to be in considerable tension, though, with putative faith-based knowledge. For at least on a popular Christian conception, when you believe something truly on the basis of faith this isn't because of anything you're naturally competent to do. Rather, faith-based beliefs are entirely a product of divine agency. Appearances to the contrary, I argue in this article that there's no deep tension between faith-based knowledge and virtue epistemology. Not if we learn to conceive of faith as a kind of extended knowledge.

Copyright

Corresponding author

References

Hide All
Clark, A. (2001) Mindware: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Cognitive Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998) ‘The extended mind’, Analysis, 58, 719.
Greco, J. (2010) Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Lackey, J. (2007) ‘Why we don't deserve credit for everything we know’, Synthese, 158, 345361.
Lewis, C. S. (2001) Mere Christianity: A Revised and Amplified Edition (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco).
Palermos, O. (2011) ‘Belief-forming processes, extended’, The Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2, 741765.
Palermos, O. (2014) ‘Knowledge and cognitive integration’, Synthese, 191, 19311951.
Palermos, O. & Pritchard, D. (2016) ‘The distribution of epistemic agency’, in Reider, P. (ed.) Social Epistemology and Epistemic Agency: De-Centralizing Epistemic Agency (London: Rowman & Littlefield International), 109126.
Plantinga, A. (1993) Warrant: The Current Debate (New York: Oxford University Press).
Plantinga, A. (2000) Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press).
Pritchard, D. (2010) ‘Cognitive ability and the extended cognition thesis’, Synthese, 175, 133151.
Pritchard, D., Millar, A., & Haddock, A. (2010) The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Sosa, E. (2016) ‘Epistemic competence and judgment’, in Angel, M. & Vargas, F. (eds) Performance Epistemology: Foundations and Applications (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 1929.
Wegner, D., Giuliano, T., & Hertel, P. (1985) ‘Cognitive interdependence in close relationships’, in Ickes, W. J. (ed.) Compatible and Incompatible Relationships (New York: Springer-Verlag), 253276.

Metrics

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 0
Total number of PDF views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

Abstract views

Total abstract views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between <date>. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

Usage data cannot currently be displayed