Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home

Article contents

The Reasons of a Materialist

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2009

Laurence Goldstein
Affiliation:
University of Hong Kong

Abstract

Image of the first page of this article
Type
Discussion
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1980

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below.

References

1 Glassen, P., ‘J. J. C. Smart, Materialism and Occam's Razor’, Philosophy 51, No. 197 (07 1976), 349352.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 Like Glassen, I shall assume that the brain is the only organ that a materialist or ‘physicalist’ could plausibly claim to be identical with the mind.

3 See Thorburn, W. M., ‘The Myth of Ockham's Razor’, Mind 27, No. 107 (07 1918), 345353.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4 de Ockham, G., Super Quatuor Libros Sententiarum Earumdemque Decisiones (Lugduni, 1945) 1, d. 14, q. 2 GGoogle Scholar. This commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard was written in about 1320.

5 For example, at Summa Totius Logicae I, §12. A translation of the first book of the Summa is to be found in Loux, M., Ockham's Theory of Terms (Indiana: University of Notre Dame, 1974).Google Scholar

6 Searle, J., Speech Acts (Cambridge University Press), 29.Google Scholar

7 Glassen himself recognizes that neither Occam nor the materialists would accept that Occam's Razor is a non-physical thing.

8 For Occam, the primary signs are words of mental language which he identifies as acts (in the Aristotelian sense of actualities) of understanding.

9 Summa Totius Logicae, §§14–16. This Summa may be regarded as a sustained attempt to dispel the ancient illusion ‘Unum nomen, unum nominatum’.

10 See, for example, Sellars, W., ‘Abstract Entities’, Review of Metaphysics 16, No. 64 (06 1963), 627671.Google Scholar

Full text views

Full text views reflects PDF downloads, PDFs sent to Google Drive, Dropbox and Kindle and HTML full text views.

Total number of HTML views: 0
Total number of PDF views: 14 *
View data table for this chart

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between September 2016 - 26th January 2021. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

Hostname: page-component-898fc554b-fznx4 Total loading time: 0.559 Render date: 2021-01-26T07:20:06.202Z Query parameters: { "hasAccess": "0", "openAccess": "0", "isLogged": "0", "lang": "en" } Feature Flags: { "shouldUseShareProductTool": true, "shouldUseHypothesis": true, "isUnsiloEnabled": true, "metricsAbstractViews": false, "figures": false, "newCiteModal": false }

Send article to Kindle

To send this article to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle.

Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

The Reasons of a Materialist
Available formats
×

Send article to Dropbox

To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox.

The Reasons of a Materialist
Available formats
×

Send article to Google Drive

To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive.

The Reasons of a Materialist
Available formats
×
×

Reply to: Submit a response


Your details


Conflicting interests

Do you have any conflicting interests? *