Introduction
REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation in developing countries, and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries) was adopted by the Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 2007 as a strategy to slow forest loss and as a mechanism for sustainable development. Since then REDD+ has become the largest anti-deforestation initiative in history (Angelsen, Reference Angelsen2017), drawing on a complex set of multilateral, bilateral, private, corporate, foundation and domestic investment sources (Environmental Defence Fund, 2018). More than 50 countries have initiated REDD+ programmes, and there are now > 350 projects across the tropics (Duchelle et al., Reference Duchelle, Simonet, Sunderlin and Wunder2018). Most, however, have no access to the anticipated performance-based finance from voluntary carbon markets (as defined by Seymour & Busch, Reference Seymour and Busch2016, see also Simonet et al., Reference Simonet, Karsenty, de Perthuis, Newton and Schaap2014; Sunderlin et al., Reference Sunderlin, Sills, Duchelle, Ekaputri, Kweka and Toniolo2015; Angelsen, Reference Angelsen2016), but rely instead on results-based multilateral or bilateral aid (Duchelle et al., Reference Duchelle, Simonet, Sunderlin and Wunder2018). Prompted in part by this uneven process in establishing successful REDD+ programmes, a divisive literature has emerged. Some see REDD+ as simultaneously positive for carbon, biodiversity and poverty alleviation (e.g. Angelsen, Reference Angelsen2008), citing proven results (Jayachandran et al., Reference Jayachandran, de Laat, Lambin, Stanton, Audy and Thomas2017) and its potential to garner public and private finance (e.g. Seymour & Busch, Reference Seymour and Busch2016). Others are concerned with the dangers to local community well-being inherent in commodification and monopolization of natural resources (Phelps et al., Reference Phelps, Webb and Agrawal2010; Sandbrook et al., Reference Sandbrook, Nelson, Adams and Agrawal2010), particularly in contexts with poor governance structures where vulnerable populations are at risk of displacement by multinational corporate interests (for an example, see McDermott, Reference McDermott2017). For this reason most now agree that monitoring of non-carbon outcomes (co-benefits such as livelihoods, tenure security, equitable benefit sharing and biodiversity; Hinsley et al., Reference Hinsley, Entwistle and Pio2015) is critical.
Much of this debate stems from viewing REDD+ as a monolithic, singular entity. In reality, programmes represent a wide variety of institutional forms, some of which function better than others, and vary with respect to their fit to the institutional and socio-economic context. Systematic comparisons of REDD+'s empirical successes and failures are thwarted by the highly diverse nature and structure of REDD+ projects, and their scale, community involvement, certification standards and dependence on market-based mechanisms (Simonet et al., Reference Simonet, Karsenty, de Perthuis, Newton and Schaap2014). Put another way, the degree to which site-specific design features align with broader economic/social/cultural institutions, such as free markets, rule of law and public opinion will determine the success and appropriateness of different REDD+ designs.
Consequently, debates regarding whether it is worth persisting with REDD+ as a global strategy, and in what form, should shift towards determining the specific contexts in which the instrument could be effective. We advocate such a transition because general debates concerning neo-liberalism and environmental commodification, although important, do not provide definitive guidance for immediate global challenges.
To this end we (a collaboration of partners involved with REDD+ either directly as government and non-governmental implementing agencies, or indirectly as academics) review the situation surrounding a REDD+ project in Zanzibar, Tanzania. We identify and discuss salient features of the project as implemented on the island of Pemba that, to the extent to which they are generalizable, demonstrate how, and under what specific conditions, REDD+ could be a valuable mechanism for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In particular, we draw attention to the source of the threats (corporate and/or community), the importance of pre-existing management institutions, often overlooked complementarities between centralized and decentralized management, and counterintuitive consequences of leakage.
REDD+ in Zanzibar
In 2009 Tanzania was identified as an appropriate country for piloting REDD+ because of its extensive dry tropical forest cover and rapid rates of deforestation. With the principal support of the Norwegian government, Tanzania established eight site-specific REDD+ pilot projects, for which USD 93 million was pledged (Burgess et al., Reference Burgess, Bahane, Clairs, Danielsen, Dalsgaard and Funder2010). These initiatives aimed to revitalize a history of local community-based forest management, to secure land rights, to invest in local capacity for measurement, reporting and verification, and to engage the private sector (Burgess et al., Reference Burgess, Bahane, Clairs, Danielsen, Dalsgaard and Funder2010; Katani et al., Reference Katani, Mustalahti, Mukama and Zahabu2016; Lund et al., Reference Lund, Sungusia, Mabele and Scheba2017).
One of these projects is Zanzibar's Hifadhi ya Misitu ya Asili programme, implemented under CARE International. Zanzibar consists of two main islands (Unguja and Pemba, the latter known as the Green Isle; Supplementary Material 1). Pemba and Unguja are characterized by a mix of mangrove forest (7% on both islands combined but 13% on Pemba), coral rag forest (37% and 12%), high forest (4% and 2%), and agroforestry (32% and 44%) (Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, 2008; Terra Global Capital, 2014). As a result of a long history of agroforestry, the original native forest is limited; the remainder contains a mixture of native forest with agroforestry species (introduced fruit, nut and spice trees). The annual rate of deforestation across both islands is 1.1% (Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, 2014), driven primarily by population pressure (growing at 3.2% per annum; Siex, Reference Siex2011) and poverty (on Pemba 90% of the population relies exclusively on charcoal and firewood for cooking). Fuelwood and charcoal account for 37% of the drivers of deforestation, shifting cultivation and fuelwood lots for a further 26%, and timber (for house and boat construction) for 5%; activities are conducted primarily by local community members, less so by local entrepreneurs (Terra Global Capital, 2014). Thus, deforestation on Pemba is primarily a function of household rather than business or government interests, unlike many other threatened forests globally (Hosonuma et al., Reference Hosonuma, Herold, de Sy, de Fries, Brockhaus and Verchot2012). Only 14% of all biomass consumption is accounted for by institutions and business (which are primarily local bakeries; Terra Global Capital, 2014). Rates of deforestation are expected to increase with population growth, renewed pressure for clove production (as global prices increase), and illegal offtake associated with construction for a burgeoning tourist sector on the southern island (Unguja) and government/military installations in the archipelago (Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar, 2008).
The Hifadhi ya Misitu ya Asili programme was designed to slow deforestation through poverty reduction, and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions through developing and strengthening the capacity of communities to manage existing forests (Caplow et al., Reference Caplow, Putri, Kweka and Sills2014). It involved a collaboration between a local facilitating umbrella NGO (Jumuiya ya Uhifadhi wa Misitu ya Jamii Zanzibar), CARE International, the government's Department of Forestry and Non-Renewable Natural Resources, and a San Francisco-based technical advisor (Terra Global Capital). The principal activities conducted by Hifadhi ya Misitu ya Asili entailed: (1) facilitating registration of Community Forest Management Agreements at the shehia (ward) level (thereby securing land tenure), (2) zoning high protection forested areas within each shehia, (3) supporting Shehia Conservation Committees through education, planting, restoration and the patrol and fining of illegal forest harvesting, and (4) administering trial motivation payments on the basis of shehia performance. Eighteen shehia were invited by CARE, in conjunction with the Department of Forestry, to participate in the programme. Selection criteria included a high per cent of forest cover, rapid rates of deforestation (a mean of 3.3% per annum during 2001–2010 for the 18 shehia initially selected), and free and informed consent. In August 2015 all 18 shehia had their Community Forest Management Agreements formally registered (Plate 1). At this point CARE International withdrew, and the project ended (Royal Norwegian Embassy, 2015), although the application for validation and verification of carbon issuance had not yet cleared the auditing process, a delay resulting primarily from high transaction costs associated with the technical complexities of constructing cloud-free satellite images as a forest cover baseline.
Plate 1 The celebration for the 18 shehia with registered Community Forest Management Agreements at the close of the Hifadhi ya Misitu ya Asili programme project, attended by the President of the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar and representatives from the Royal Norwegian Embassy and CARE International (Pemba, August 2015; photo: M. Borgerhoff Mulder).
Sunderlin et al. (Reference Sunderlin, Sills, Duchelle, Ekaputri, Kweka and Toniolo2015) deemed Zanzibar's Hifadhi ya Misitu ya Asili programme defunct but this was premature (see also Blomley et al., Reference Blomley, Edwards, Kingazi, Lukumbuzya, Mäkelä and Vesa2017). On the one hand, 18 Pemban shehia have formally recognized registered Community Forest Management Agreements, although one is currently ceding its status. Another 10 shehia have elected to enter the process, four await final ministerial signature, and six are in the registration process. On the other hand, there are as yet no carbon payments to communities for their conservation efforts because of continued delay in validation and verification. Despite these problems, most communities are still conducting conservation activities and, with no operational budget, Department of Forestry staff continue to work with them, assisting the Shehia Conservation Committees with management issues, for example.
To date, the outcomes for Pemban communities with Community Forest Management Agreements status are mixed. On the positive side, with their registration titles, shehia have stronger tenure rights to their forests, authority to charge revenue for legal timber use, and clearly defined land-use plans. There are some indications of success, albeit limited. A comparison of baseline rates of deforestation (2001–2010) to recent rates (2010–2018) reveals that of the 18 Pemban shehia with registered Community Forest Management Agreements six have managed to slow their rates of net deforestation during 2010–2018 (Fig. 1, Supplementary Material 2, Supplementary Tables 1 & 2), and two had greater forest cover in 2018 than in 2010. Community members point to the help they receive from the Department of Forestry in managing their forests, particularly with respect to the fining of those who steal trees and the removal of corrupt Shehia Conservation Committee members (JA & ASN, unpubl. data). REDD-ready communities have also benefitted from motivation payments that were distributed either as community benefits (health facilities, mosques, madrassa) or as household payments. Furthermore, many shehia now have small-scale enterprise groups who plant firewood lots and sell their produce. Finally, there are now shehia petitioning the Department of Forestry to enter the REDD+ process (the 10 cases mentioned above, and see further details below).
Fig. 1 Pemba, showing the 18 shehia with Community Forest Management, and the annual rate of deforestation in each (from Landsat 5, 7 and 8 imagery) between our historical base (2001–2010) and 2010–2018. Deforestation has decelerated (or reversed) in eight shehia and accelerated in 10 shehia. All details, including source of shape files, are in Supplementary Material 2.
On the negative side, deforestation persists in all but two shehia, and the rate is increasing in 10 shehia (Fig. 1). Although this is perhaps unsurprising given the absence of any financial support since 2014 and of any carbon payments, this indicates that the conservation behaviour promoted by REDD-readiness has not percolated to the majority of shehia that participated in Hifadhi ya Misitu ya Asili. Most palpably, the ‘economy of expectations’ (Fletcher et al., Reference Fletcher, Dressler, Buscher and Anderson2016) looms large. For almost 5 years communities have been motivated with the promise of carbon payments, yet nothing has materialized and there is marked frustration. Internal conflicts emerge when land zoned for high protection contains clove trees; families now plan to revive clove production, to capitalize on improved market prices. Community members also feel that the government and/or project is failing to provide them with the anticipated financial assistance. Finally, there is a technical disagreement over the calculation of the value of Zanzibar's terrestrial carbon (Ravikumar et al., Reference Ravikumar, Larjavaara, Larson and Kanninen2017; Supplementary Material 1). In short, outcomes are mixed. There is only weak evidence of slowing deforestation in some shehia, reductions that cannot be directly linked to the Hifadhi ya Misitu ya Asili programme; furthermore, although the programme yields important co-benefits these cannot substitute for increased carbon storage.
To some extent the experiences of Hifadhi ya Misitu ya Asili mirror those from other Tanzanian REDD+ sites (Table 1), and the broader global situation (Sunderlin et al., Reference Sunderlin, Sills, Duchelle, Ekaputri, Kweka and Toniolo2015; Seymour & Busch, Reference Seymour and Busch2016). Most notably none of the Norwegian initiative projects appear to have yet generated carbon payments. The measurement, reporting and verification required for carbon certification demands technical expertise that community-based projects struggle to access (Phelps et al., Reference Phelps, Webb and Agrawal2010), leading to long delays, no payments and faltering communication. More specifically, some studies reveal internal conflicts over land zoning as a common occurrence (Larson et al., Reference Larson, Brockhaus, Sunderlin, Duchelle, Babon and Dokken2013; Dokken et al., Reference Dokken, Caplow, Angelsen and Sunderlin2014), often exacerbated by corruption and elite capture, as in Unguja (Benjaminsen, Reference Benjaminsen2014; but see Sutta & Silayo, Reference Sutta and Silayo2014) and elsewhere (e.g. Scheba & Rakotonarivo, Reference Scheba and Rakotonarivo2016), as well as failure to reach desired levels of participation (Eilola et al., Reference Eilola, Fagerholm, Mäki, Khamis and Käyhkö2015). Although there are reports of successful community engagement in some cases (e.g. Uisso et al., Reference Uisso, Chirwa, Ackerman and Mbwambo2019), elsewhere disenfranchisement is emphasized (Bartholdson et al., Reference Bartholdson, Abdallah, Marquardt and Salomonsson2019). More generally, REDD+ projects exist within a complicated web of NGOs, consultants, government agencies, businesses and international bodies. From the perspective of communities living at the forest edge, and the local organizations that act on their behalf, navigating these networks demands daunting levels of human and social capital.
Table 1 The fate of REDD+ pilot projects in Tanzania. These data are for REDD+ pilot projects supported by the Norwegian Embassy1.
1 An additional REDD+ project, in Yaeda Valley, is selling carbon credits as of 2019 but was not part of the original Norwegian project.
2 Data from personal communication to JBA from May 2017 onwards (also see Simonet et al., Reference Simonet, Karsenty, de Perthuis, Newton and Schaap2014), updated using online databases as of March 2019.
Recommendations for where REDD+ could work
Not all drivers of deforestation are the same
Perhaps the most trenchant critique of REDD+ is that it is unable to counter political and economic interests that stand to gain from the conversion of tropical forests. Examples of these business as usual scenarios are the soy industry in Brazil and oil palm industry in Indonesia, where REDD+ is effectively outbid by commercial profit-seekers. Links between commercial logging companies and government ministers, or between agricultural subsidies and corruption, are a persistent global challenge (e.g. Sills et al., Reference Sills, Stibniati, De Sassi, Duchelle, Kweka, Pradnja and Sunderlin2014; Capitani et al., Reference Capitani, van Soesbergen, Mukama, Malugu, Mbilinyi and Chamuya2019).
Nonetheless, situations differ by context. On Pemba the primary drivers of deforestation are local: households extracting fuel and timber, and their expanding agricultural/clove production. Communities also have interests in the fruits and medicines available in the forest, and children hunt forest birds and mammals. Although there is some illegal offtake by government and commercial interests, this is not a significant driver of deforestation in comparison to uses by local communities (Terra Global Capital, 2014; Blomley et al., Reference Blomley, Edwards, Kingazi, Lukumbuzya, Mäkelä and Vesa2016).
Even the revival of the historically important clove industry (Sheriff, Reference Sheriff1987) on Pemba differs structurally from that of large scale business as usual operations. After a slump in the 1990s, clove prices are currently rebounding towards a historical high (Brzoskiewicz, Reference Brzoskiewicz2018). Although cloves are grown in agroforestry plots and agroforestry is a major source of loss of native forest, there are three factors that mitigate this to some extent. Firstly, cloves are locally-owned, albeit sometimes by affluent families with roots in Oman (reflecting the flight of the wealthiest land-owning class to that country after the 1964 revolution); nevertheless, both local and Oman-based clove-owning families have strong kin ties on the island, and are not equivalent to foreign corporate interests. Secondly, cloves are not grown in conventional plantations, but in an agroforestry matrix. As such, cloves do not pose a landscape-level threat comparable to oil palm or soy mono-cropping. Thirdly, because forests interspersed with clove trees contribute to land considered forested by verification standards (because the woody biomass still holds carbon), there is little opportunity cost for communities attempting to maximize carbon storage as they can benefit simultaneously from cloves and carbon.
In short, Pemba is not a case where REDD+ is challenged by conventional plantation economies or land grabs. Accordingly we contend that valid critiques of REDD+ as a strategy in Brazil and Indonesia (Brockhaus et al., Reference Brockhaus, Obidzinski, Dermawan, Laumonier and Luttrell2012; Edwards et al., Reference Edwards, Koh and Laurance2012; Henders et al., Reference Henders, Persson and Kastner2015) are misplaced for a large number of REDD+ projects where forest-dependent communities are struggling to make a living; these communities have interests in protecting their forests from outsiders. In this sense our conclusions align with those of Robinson et al. (Reference Robinson, Albers, Meshack and Lokina2013) for other sites in Tanzania, where key drivers of deforestation are also local extraction of forest products (see also Blomley et al., Reference Blomley, Edwards, Kingazi, Lukumbuzya, Mäkelä and Vesa2016). In such contexts an approach based on community forestry linked to REDD+ can offer a suite of incentives to reduce deforestation, precisely because its incentives reward those primarily responsible for deforestation.
Centralization is not inevitable
Since its inception, the risk of centralization has loomed over REDD+ (Phelps et al., Reference Phelps, Webb and Agrawal2010; Sandbrook et al., Reference Sandbrook, Nelson, Adams and Agrawal2010). The main concerns are loss of community control over traditional forests (Barr & Sayer, Reference Barr and Sayer2012), exclusionary government regulations (Thompson et al., Reference Thompson, Baruah and Carr2011), and elite capture (Andersson et al., Reference Andersson, Smith, Alston, Duchelle, Mwangi and Larson2018). Where these occur, centralized forest management engendered by REDD+ can undercut community management (Brown, Reference Brown2013). Centralizing tendencies emerge in part because REDD+ is increasingly implemented at a national or jurisdictional level (ostensibly to avoid leakage), and in part because complex carbon accounting, including monitoring, reporting and verification, demands expertise from skilled partners who are generally unavailable locally (Phelps et al., Reference Phelps, Webb and Agrawal2010). In addition, the increased commodity value of forests on environmental markets inevitably lures central governments, and/or other investors, to seek rents or land grabs (Sandbrook et al., Reference Sandbrook, Nelson, Adams and Agrawal2010). Nevertheless, REDD+ projects vary greatly in their scale, degree of centralization and how each programme interacts with government institutions (West, Reference West2016), making such generalizations problematic.
Tanzania has a history of progressive forest management that provides fortuitous institutional pre-adaptations for the development of REDD+ institutions (Burgess et al., Reference Atmadja and Verchot2010; Kweka et al., Reference Kweka, Carmenta, Hyle, Mustalahti, Dokken and Brockhaus2015; Blomley et al., Reference Blomley, Edwards, Kingazi, Lukumbuzya, Mäkelä and Vesa2016). The Hifadhi ya Misitu ya Asili programme grew out of this tradition, specifically from an earlier (1996–2005) small community forestry project funded by CARE, which focused on conservation and community development in 10 villages around Ngezi forest, the largest remaining area of high forest on the island. Because of these early successes, the Hifadhi ya Misitu ya Asili partners elected to scale up this community management model from the village to the shehia level, and roll it out at the archipelago scale. Thus, the programme was not imposed on a void but rather built onto a history of decentralized forest management with formal government support; conservation committees, albeit of varying skills, reputation and credibility, already existed at some sites. Some such committees date back to British colonial conservation policies (Supplementary Material 3) and continue to display strong commitments to protecting their forests. Engaging with existing institutions rather than imposing new structures is associated with successful outcomes for community projects (Brooks et al., Reference Brooks, Waylen and Borgerhoff Mulder2012). In short, with such pre-existing institutions pressures for centralization are less likely to destroy REDD+ programmes.
Quite to the contrary, across Pemba we observe considerable opportunities for complementarities between community management and government oversight. Not only does the fate of government-run forests depend heavily on the activities of Shehia Conservation Committees in neighbouring communities, but members of the Shehia Conservation Committees depend on Department of Forestry personnel to help depersonalize socially costly punishments and fines amongst otherwise tightly-knit communities (Robinson & Lokina, Reference Robinson and Lokina2012). There is thus a synergy in which both communities and the forest department provision specialized conservation goods that they each have an advantage in producing. This may be a byproduct of an unusually highly community-orientated stance amongst some government personnel (Eilola et al., Reference Eilola, Fagerholm, Mäki, Khamis and Käyhkö2015), but it shows that REDD+ interventions can potentially profit from closer coordination (either spatially or institutionally) with government institutions when there are benefits from specialization.
Leakage can promote conservation adoption
Finally, we note that leakage, typically considered a barrier to sub-national programmes, can be co-opted under specific conditions to drive the spread of community forestry. Leakage is a major problem for any performance-based payments intervention scheme because people and communities can simply shift their environmentally degrading activities to other areas (Atmadja & Verchot, Reference Atmadja and Verchot2012). As elsewhere, leakage occurs on Pemba. Once a REDD+ shehia begins to develop formal institutions to protect its local forest, citizens are potentially incentivized to enter neighboring shehia that do not have such protections, to harvest forest products. This is particularly prevalent given the mosaic structure of the REDD+ shehia (Fig. 1). The result is a growth in the rate of deforestation for adjoining shehia and an increase in competition amongst communities over remaining patches of forest. To reduce leakage, multiple adjoining shehia have begun to petition the Department of Forestry to obtain Community Forest Management Agreements, thereby attaining the legal rights to develop their own institutions to protect their forests from outsiders (Andrews & Borgerhoff Mulder, Reference Andrews and Borgerhoff Mulder2018); this mirrors instances of shehia cooperation seen in Unguja (Eilola et al., Reference Eilola, Fagerholm, Mäki, Khamis and Käyhkö2015). Capitalizing on the shift in opportunity costs created by leakage into adjoining areas allows REDD+ projects to leverage this ‘frontier effect’ (cf. Turchin, Reference Turchin2003) to promote a cascade of interest amongst non-participating communities. This means that in places already suffering high offtake from external sources, local people are likely to have high demand for the services that conservation programmes such as REDD+ can offer. Such interest is of course critical to the provision of free and prior informed consent, integral to acquiring Community Forest Management Agreement status.
Conclusion
We propose that generalizations about REDD+ are counterproductive. Instead, and by way of recommendations regarding implementation, we advocate identifying economic, ecological and institutional settings in which REDD+ may be able to deliver its promises. As a team working on Pemba, we believe that many of the currently popular critiques of REDD+ focus on conditions that are not generalizable. Firstly, the threat to community management does not always lie in countering multinational corporate interests in forests: forest-dependent communities can share some goals with advocates of REDD+ with respect to excluding outsiders. Secondly, REDD+ initiatives, when built onto pre-existing decentralized, community-based forestry institutions, will not inevitably fall prey to the predatory whims of centralized government: there are overlooked complementarities between centralized top-down governance and local community management, with each specializing in producing different institutional goods. Finally, there may be unanticipated benefits from the occurrence of leakage that can be harnessed to expand site-specific REDD+ interventions.
We do not downplay the challenges facing incipient REDD+ projects, nor suggest that conditional payments are a panacea for success or that REDD+ in Pemba is, or will ever be, a success. But we do contend that dismissals of REDD+ as a doomed conservation fad fail to appreciate the diversity of programmes and actors, and the great amount of institutional learning that has taken place in this process.
Acknowledgements
We thank the 2nd Vice President's Office and the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources for permission to conduct research in Zanzibar, Daniel Karp, Neil Burgess and anonymous reviewers for comments, Jon Salerno for accessing the shape files from the National Bureau of Statistics (Dar es Salaam), Aniruddha Ghosh and Kate Tiedeman for technical advice with regards to Google Earth Engine mapping, and Erica Meta Smith of Terra Global Capital for comments. Funding for this project was made possible by a Seed Grant for International Activities from University of California Davis Global Affairs.
Author contributions
Writing: MBM, JBA, TC; processing of data for Fig. 1, writing Supplementary Material 2: AC; other inputs, ideas, background and field support: BBH, HSK, AM, ASN.
Conflicts of interest
Jumuiya ya Uhifadhi wa Misitu ya Jamii Zanzibar is the implementing NGO, but all authors are motivated to improve the chances of REDD+ being implemented on Zanzibar for the reasons argued herein.
Ethical standards
This research was conducted with permission of the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar. Ethical clearance was granted by University of California Davis Institutional Review Board ID991486 to MBM for ‘Community-Based Forest Conservation under REDD in Pemba, Zanzibar’, and the research otherwise abided by the Oryx guidelines on ethical standards.
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