The article questions whether it is possible to derive natural laws from human sociability. It examines the work of Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas, and concludes that there are certain natural laws that can be derived from the social character of human beings. Some of these hold across all societies and at all times (semper et ad semper) whereas others hold only in general but are subject to exceptions (semper sed non ad semper). The article concludes by confronting an anti-social and immoralist challenge to the idea of natural laws of sociability.

I present a short summary of the traditional pagan and Christian legacy claiming that hell is above all a place of pain and the objections that have been addressed to it. Then I proceed to my main point:tracing a philosophical thread from Plato to Aristotle and then from Augustine to Aquinas, and citing a psychological experience of everyday life, I maintain that: 1) either there is no pain in hell, or 2) hell is not the worst thing that can happen to a human being. Then I present four possible objections to my thesis and attempt to counter them. In the last section I point to some practical consequences on the pastoral level that could ensue from a different doctrine on the nature of hell.

This essay argues that there is a serious deficiency in all sub-disciplines of theology, in their failure to ask the further question of how any of them might then seriously engage the believer in their conclusions. Philosophy of religion, biblical studies and systematic theology are surveyed in turn, to explore further the nature of this missing link, in imaginative engagement. While visual art is used to illustrate how this could be provided, it is not claimed that this is the only way that this could be achieved, only that it is a largely ignored dimension in much contemporary discussion of the arts.

The proportion of older people in the population is rapidly increasing, both nationally and globally. This demographic shift poses some pressing practical challenges for governments as they seek to provide care for an ageing population; but in addition, it raises sociocultural and theological questions about how the role and significance of older people is understood in contemporary developed economies. In response to these challenges, the present paper attempts to identify the outlines of an emerging Catholic Social Teaching on old age in the encyclicals and words of the last three popes. Two key themes are identified which inform a distinctive Catholic perspective on old age. These are the continuing pilgrimage, role and contribution of older people to the end of life on the one hand, and their challenge to the values of a ‘throwaway culture’ on the other. The foundational significance of these themes for an emerging Catholic witness form the basis for the concluding recommendations.

Joseph Ratzinger/Pope Benedict XVI called Blessed John Henry Newman “an important influence in my own life and thought.” In his memoirs, Ratzinger describes the energy with which Newman's work on conscience, history, and on the development of doctrine was read and discussed in his seminary days. Yet, in terms of Ratzinger's own work on history, tradition, and revelation, he makes almost no direct mention of Newman in his writings over his long theological career. This paper, by comparing the two theologians’ writings on the subject, seeks to ascertain whether and to what extent Newman's theology of tradition and revelation had an impact on Ratzinger's theology.

This paper continues as the second part of my study of the relationship of Fr. Lawrence Dewan OP and Etienne Gilson. My first paper explored their metaphysical differences, while this second paper explores their common commitment to Christian philosophy and to St. Thomas Aquinas’ seminal work on the interrelationship of faith and reason as manifest most clearly in the interrelationship of revealed theology and philosophy. This leads us into a closer examination of Gilson's sustained treatment of this topic. However, we must acknowledge that this topic is often susceptible to unproductive philosophical and metaphysical abstraction. In order to avoid this, we depart from the standard method of treatment through an interdisciplinary appeal to the theological, philosophical, and historical implications of the bodily resurrection of Christ.

Modern theodicies often offer definitive explanations for the unsolvable problem of human suffering. This philosophical enterprise was challenged by David B. Burrell's book, Deconstructing Theodicy: Why Job Has Nothing to Say to the Puzzle of Suffering (2008). His observations about the book of Job and the way it militates against theodical speculation are compelling, but there is a missed opportunity with his exegesis of Job 42:6. The Hebrew of Job's last words can be translated in at least five distinct (and legitimate) ways. Using this grammatical characteristic, this paper argues that the ambiguity in 42:6 creates an “unfinalizable” quality that allows sufferers to be unsilenced and participate in the meaning-making process. Situating the addendum with philosophical ruminations on theodicy, the argument turns to an exegetical section that comments on Burrell's discussion in “Denouement and Epilogue” and analyzes the Hebrew grammar of Job 42:1-6. This addendum compliments Burrell's deconstruction of theodicy, adding a further pool of resources for sufferers to remain unsilenced and narrate their own questioning of God.

The idea of sacred sites or holy ground has been an important aspect of a number of major world religions. While the concept has received longstanding scholarly attention in connection with the traditional Abrahamic faiths, the ways in which late-modern and contemporary movements have developed the idea has been little studied. This paper reviews the ways in which twentieth-century new religions adopted and developed the idea of holy place. Three movements form the core case studies: The Panacea Society, a breakaway Anglican group based in Bedford in England, which came to believe their garden was the site of Eden; the American Theosophical Society, which founded a utopian community in California understood as the site of the emergence of a new spiritual age; and Jamaican Rastafari who came to regard a territory south of Addis Ababa in Ethiopia as salvific. Common themes emerging from the case studies include the ways in which ideas about holy ground (1) draw on available theological motifs, (2) express emerging theological principles, and (3) are catalysed by stress or challenge. Finally, the discussion reflects on the role of holy ground in these movements in the light of classic and contemporary understandings of place and religious imagination.

A significant demographic event or the advent of a natural disaster sees a surge in demand for a particular good or service. Conventional liberal market economics dictates that vendors should increase their prices to restore equilibrium to the market. Such an increase in price would provide an incentive for vendors to increase output or redirect their resources to those areas where there is a peak in demand. In the case of ride-share operators such as Uber, this is reflected in their surge pricing models to encourage drivers to service those areas where demand has spiked. Is such an increase in price justified according to the ethical principles of St. Thomas Aquinas' economic philosophy?

This article explores St. Thomas Aquinas's doctrine of grace for the way in which it heals and moves the sinner towards justification. It exposits Thomas's use of the language of “impetration” to express a causal yet non-meritorious role for human action, and it applies this conception to the free will's movement in justification. It argues that Thomas understands the prayer of a sinner to illumine the way in which God's infallible and predestinating will unfolds through human actors without destroying their contingent nature. To that end, it first exposits critical points in Thomas's doctrine of grace, including the notions of habitual grace and auxilium, intact and fallen human nature, and operative and cooperative grace. It then introduces the language of impetration for the way in which it elucidates a valuable role for human action in justification. It concludes that impetration illustrates the on-going perfection of nature in such a way that God's grace draws human beings into the causal sequence of divine providence. The sinner's impetration captures the indispensable movement of the free will while recognizing that, in its appeal to divine mercy, it has already been graced by God and cannot earn the gift of justification.

In the prologue to I-II of the Summa Theologica, Thomas Aquinas says that part of the image of God in human beings is that the human person liberum arbitrium habens et suorum operum potestatem - “has free will” (liberum arbitrium habens) and what is often translated as “control of their actions” (suorum operum potestatem). This article makes the case for translating “suorum operum potestatem” as “power over their works,” giving this passage a distinctly political and economic significance. It contends that Thomas is assigning human beings precisely what critics of capitalism claim that industrial society denies them. The “works” that people do in homes, offices, factories, farms, and hospitals - the things that they get paid (or don't get paid) a wage for - ought to be their very own, because they are a means by which people can grow in virtue. Translating “suorum operum potestas” in this way puts Thomas in conversation not only with modern anti-capitalist leftists like Karl Mark, but also with Russian Orthodox theologian Sergei Bulgakov, who envisioned work as a form of priestly activity that “humanized” creation by rendering it to God.

The article argues that philosophers of religion and theologians should pay less attention to the so-called ‘classical attributes’ of God and more attention to the neglected, but venerable, tradition of the divine names. Grounded in Scripture, these reflections are predicated on the doctrine of Creation, and what it is for human beings as creatures to speak of their Creator. The article demonstrates that, even the so-called ‘classical attributes’, when placed in the divine names tradition, are far from being mere ‘natural theology’ but Christological to the core and lead us, through intellect, into the mysteries of awe and prayer.

This article seeks to explore the thinking of Edward Bouverie Pusey on the doctrine of transubstantiation. It begins by looking at the conflicted way Pusey is considered and goes on to examine Pusey's writings on transubstantiation. The article points out that Pusey's early writing on transubstantiation wrongly believed that the doctrine implied a carnal view of Christ's presence in the Eucharist, but that in his mature thinking this caricature was abandoned and he came to understand that transubstantiation is a form of moderate realism. Some detailed examination of Pusey's mature thinking is undertaken, including a very important set of correspondence between Edward Pusey and John Newman in 1867 which addressed the doctrine of transubstantiation. Pusey's thinking reveals that he is prepared to accept the word transubstantiation as long as it does not imply a change in the substance of the bread and wine of the Eucharist. The article concludes with discussion on the term transubstantiation itself and controversially cites evidence from both Anglican and Roman Catholic sources which suggest that the dependence on a particular scholastic philosophical analysis which attempts to explain the ‘how’ of the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist may be less useful than an approach of ‘what’. Pusey's mature thinking on transubstantiation is seen as useful for ecumenical dialogue between the Anglican and Roman Catholic Churches.

This article examines the version of Christocentric exemplarism recently proposed by theologian Patrick Clark, whose Thomistic virtue ethics incorporates features of Linda Zagzebski's exemplarist moral theory. This article suggests that Clark and similar approaches to Christocentric virtue ethics would be better situated to appropriate Zagzebski's insights into exemplarity if it gave more prominence to the imitation of Jesus.

Already in St. Bonaventure's Collationes in Hexaemeron there is a rudimentary theory of doctrinal development that confronts the historical problematic encountered most forcefully in modernity. This is the result of Bonaventure's urgent need to respond to the difficulties of Joachimism wherein Francis of Assisi is believed to have ushered in the new age of the Holy Spirit disassociated from the Bible, sacraments, and the institutional Church. In response Bonaventure elucidates an understanding of divine revelation in which new historical epochs allow the Church through the wise and holy mystic-contemplative to read more deeply of the word of God so as to gain a deeper insight into what has already been given in Jesus Christ. In this way the newness of Francis is preserved by grounding his radical way of life in continuity with the once-for-all revelation of God and the Church. In so doing Bonaventure anticipates the particularly modern historical problematic and paves a way forward that preserves the integrity of revelation centuries before the likes of John Henry Newman, Yves M-J Congar, and others.

Pusey is often characterised as obscurantist and conservative in his rejection of the higher literary criticism of the Bible in the later part of the nineteenth century. Much of the criticism of Pusey has focused on a limited assessment of Pusey as a scriptural scholar and on unfair psychological analysis. This article examines Pusey's epistemology more deeply and concludes that he had a breadth of vision which commends itself to the modern world as a critique of reason rather than a rejection of reason. Pusey's role as a biblical scholar is reassessed within the broad context of the Oxford Movement.

It is commonly held that that the dominance of logical positivism, in the early part of the twentieth-century, hindered Newman's philosophical recognition. However, commentators also argue that Newman's writing began to gain wider recognition following Wittgenstein's reference to “H Newman” (1969) in the posthumous publication of On Certainty. This essay explores whether or not this version of the history of Newman's philosophical reception rings true – exploring whether or not the reference to “H Newman” really marks a watershed for Newman's philosophical legacy.

Medical and/or social gender transition need not involve denial of one's biological sex, but raises other taxing ethical issues. These range from sexual ethics issues narrowly understood to consideration of the claims of any spouse or children and indeed, of gender-discordant younger people who may follow one's example. As with intersex conditions, not all crossdressing or use of cross-sex hormones is excluded absolutely. Detransition, for example, could be rightly deferred for various reasons. However, as illustrated by the analogy of an infertile woman wanting to present as the pregnant mother of a child she plans to adopt, there is a significant social value in accurate bodily and other outward communication of one's actual/predominant sex (and occupancy of key allied roles).

Much of Yves M-J. Congar's O.P. (1904-1995) later work concentrates more explicitly on pneumatology, most famously his three-volume I believe in the Holy Spirit (1979-80). Writing shortly after its publication, Congar notes that “if he could draw only one conclusion from [his] studies on the Holy Spirit, it would concern the Spirit's bond with the Word. There is no breath without speaking or articulating something.” Congar later argues in The Word and the Spirit (1984) that the doctrines of pneumatology and Christology should not be treated separately but should inform and shape each other. This led him to develop what he termed a pneumatological Christology and a Christological pneumatology. A criticism that Congar dealt with on several occasions was that Catholic theology suffered from a form of Christomonism, whereby the Holy Spirit appeared to be subordinated to the Son, with dire consequences for the ecclesial life of the church. This essay briefly examines the accusation of Christomonism and evaluates Congar's response to it. It primarily does this by critically engaging with Congar's image of the Son as the Word and the Spirit as the Breath. As well as evaluating Congar's approach, this essay also suggests how his language could be expanded further.