Modern communications and transportation have brought about not only interdependency between all regions of the world but also an increase in offences committed by or against foreigners or their States. Different States handle this problem in different ways. Among other means, one might mention in this context the enactment of rules of municipal and international law which regulate substantive as well as procedural relationships between authorities of a given State and the perpetrator of an offence with a foreign element'. Such an element exists, for example, if an offence has been committed by a foreigner; if an offence has been committed against a foreigner; if a particular State is to pass judgment on an offence committed abroad; if an offence has been committed in a place where no legal system claims jurisdiction; if a judgment is to be rendered on an offence which has already been the subject of a foreign judgment; if a person is sought for extradition; or if judicial authorities have to take measures in the course of criminal proceedings in the territory of a foreign State, and so on.

Regulation of maritime transport is, in many countries a common phenomenon. The following three categories of regulation can be distinguished:

– rules of competition in the field of maritime transport, often referred to as conference or anti-conference legislation,

– flag preference provisions, e.g., cargo reservation provisions,

– retortion provisions or retaliatory provisions.

Provisions in these three categories all have in common that they are aimed to influence the market conditions under which maritime transport takes place. I have outlined the various national provisions regulating maritime transport in a 1979 report for the Dutch section of the ILA. Part III of that report analyses the question to what extent national provisions are compatible with international public law. The present article is a summary of that analysis.

This article first examines the entire range of agency relationships between an international organisation, acting as a principal, and one or more states, acting as its agent(s). It is here argued that an agency relationship between an international organisation and one or more state(s) can be established by the constitutive treaty of the organisation, or ad hoc. In particular, an ad hoc agency relationship results from a state placing one of its organs at the disposal of an international organisation and under its effective control, with the purpose of carrying out functions of that organisation.

The article then examines the consequences for the responsibility of the organisation and the relevant state(s) of an agency relationship between an international organisation acting as a principal and one or more states acting as its agent(s). It is demonstrated that an international organisation may be responsible for damage caused by the conduct of the state. Furthermore, it is argued that the state itself may bear responsibility for having established or for not having terminated the agency relationship if it commits wrongful conduct on behalf of the international organisation.

“International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim.”

“Power” is one of the most central concepts in politics. For many years political scientists and sociologists have debated the term and tried to agree on its precise content. In a recent study about economic power concentrations in the Netherlands, Mokken and Stokman and their collaborators surveyed the theoretical position of the concepts “power” and “influence”. Most of the theoretical debates are held within the confines of American political science. A number of contributions in a recent issue of The American Political Science Review show that these debates have not yet come to an end. Most of these debates concern “community power”, that is power as it manifests itself within local communities. The most important contributions to this debate have been made by American and British political scientists.

Supreme Court, 13 April 2012, Mothers of Srebrenica Foundation v. the State of the Netherlands and the United Nations

Since 1 March 2001, family courts in the European Union (except Denmark) have been obliged to follow the rules of EC Regulation No. 1347/2000 of 29 May 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters and in Matters of Parental Responsibility for Children of Both Spouses. The Regulation was meant to complement the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters of 27 September 1968, and that is why it has come to be known as the ‘Brussels II Regulation’. The Convention covers, roughly speaking, patrimonial matters – such as property, contracts and torts – while the Regulation deals with divorce and child custody. On 1 March 2002, another Regulation entered into force, replacing the Brussels Convention and therefore aptly called the ‘Brussels I Regulation’. However, ‘Brussels I’ does not apply in Denmark, and that means that the Brussels Convention is still in force as between Denmark and the other EU member states. To complicate matters further, another Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters continues to apply in all EU member states, as well as in Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Poland: the Lugano Convention of 1988. Its text is virtually identical to that of the Brussels Convention, but there are major differences between the Lugano Convention and the Brussels I Regulation. As far as patrimonial matters are concerned, the courts in Europe now have to juggle with three different sets of rules: the Brussels I Regulation, the Brussels Convention and the Lugano Convention.

Although Professor Van Eikema Hommes' article “Grotius on Natural and International Law” contains some acute observations, it is submitted that it provides an incorrect view of Grotius' methodology, which results in a one-sided description of his system of international law. The aim of this paper is to criticize this view through a more careful exposition of Grotius' methodology, and from this to derive a broad insight into the basics of his law of nations, in particular the law of war and natural law, which will be assessed in the light of modern conceptions.

The Code of Civil Procedure contains provisions by which aliens do not have the rights in civil legal cases which are accorded to Dutch nationals. An alien, who is a plaintiff in a court case, may be obliged to put up security for the costs. With a few exceptions, aliens generally have no right to cost free access or to free legal assistance. The subject of the cautio and cost free access and free legal assistance have been given a great deal of attention in recent years from various quarters. In an international context the Council of Europe and the Hague Conference on Private International Law paid attention to these legal concepts. In a national context the Minister of Justice presented a bill to the Second Chamber and published a draft, containing proposals for a new edition of the above-mentioned articles. I will first deal with activities in the Netherlands and then go on to discuss what has been happening in an international context. However, before I do this, a short description of the Dutch provisions concerned with the legal aspects in question is needed for a proper understanding of the subject.

A decision of the Dutch Supreme Court delivered on 26th May 1978 continues to provoke a good deal of discussion in the Netherlands and, if reflected in the judicial decisions of other countries, could prove to be of very great significance. The question at issue was who should be liable to pay the often enormous costs of removing shipwrecks from the seabed outside territorial waters. The facts of the Dutch case were as follows.

The year 2005 marks the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the World Trade Organization – the multilateral body responsible for regulating the global trading regime. Whether because or in spite of the organization's existence, trade has brought unprecedented levels of economic prosperity to various parts of the world within this period. Even those parts of what used to be called ‘the Third World’ are beginning to challenge the appropriateness of that unfortunate categorization. However, much of sub-Saharan Africa has not only failed to become part of this trend, but has in fact become poorer than it was 25 years ago. Various excuses have been proffered, amongst which is that the GATT/WTO regime represents an impediment to its economic emancipation. This interdisciplinary critique aims to challenge this orthodoxy by offering a different analysis of the region's inability to trade, and by extension, of its failure to realize the rights proclaimed under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966.

Aux termes de l'article premier de la Convention sur la haute mer conclue à Genève le 29 avril 1958, «on entend par «haute mer» toutes les parties de la mer n'appartenant pas à la mer territoriale ou aux eaux intérieures d'un Etat ».

Ce qui frappe à la lecture de cet article, c'est le caractère négatif de la définition qu'elle contient: la haute mer y est décrite comme ce qui reste de « la mer », déduction faite de « la mer territoriale » et des « eaux intérieures ».

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948, is the first UN human rights document to include civil and political rights as well as economic, social and cultural rights. However, since that time a dichotomy between civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights has characterized UN human rights activities. In 1966 the General Assembly adopted two separate human rights documents: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Two separate covenants were drafted as a result of western pressure. Western countries stressed the alleged difference in character of both categories of rights: civil and political rights could be implemented immediately while most economic, social and cultural rights could be implemented only progressively. In the Vienna Declaration, adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights in 1993, the principle of the equality of all rights was, however, forcefully emphasized.