In the aftermath of the coup of August 19,1992, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet or Verkhovna Rada passed a Declaration of Independence whose approval was to be put to a referendum three months later. Shortly thereafter, as happened in many other republics, the local Communist Party was banned. Even though its organizational existence may have been snuffed out, its representatives continued to live on in posts both in the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and within the state and economic structures. Throughout the fall of 1991, Ukraine attempted to steer clear of participation in the decaying structures of central power, seeking to remain aloof from the Nova Ogoreva process that sought to fashion a new Union Treaty. Ukrainian elites pursued such a course even though the newly envisioned Union would provide the republics with powers beyond those that were ceded to the republics under the previous Union Treaty of Sovereign States. The ostensible reason for their political demurral was the unwillingness of Ukrainian elites to compromise the forthcoming referendum on independence by getting involved in any organization or structures that would unduly constrain the exercise of independence. On December 1, 1991, the referendum on Ukrainian national independence was finally held. As far as Ukrainian nationalists were concerned, the referendum was a great success: with strong support not only where one would expect it, i.e., in the Western and Central Ukraine, but also in regions considered most likely to fear, and thus least likely to support, Ukrainian independence—Russians in Eastern and Southern Ukraine. Russians in Crimea, and Ruthenians, Hungarians, and Romanians in Western Ukraine. The strong support of these minorities notwithstanding, it is not a forgone conclusion that secessionist politics within Ukraine (rather than of Ukraine) has been finally been put to rest. In fact, this trend bears watching in coming years in Ukraine.