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Obligatory Actions, Obligatory Maxims

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 July 2020

Samuel Kahn
Affiliation:
Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis
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Abstract

In this article, I confront Parfit’s Mixed Maxims Objection. I argue that recent attempts to respond to this objection fail, and I argue that their failure is compounded by the failure of recent attempts to show how the Formula of Universal Law can be used to demarcate the category of obligatory maxims. I then set out my own response to the objection, drawing on remarks from Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals for inspiration and developing a novel account of how the Formula of Universal Law can be employed to determine the deontic status of action tokens, action types and maxims.

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Articles
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© The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Kantian Review

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