Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
×
Home

How A-theoretic Deprivationists Should Respond to Lucretius

  • NATALJA DENG (a1)

Abstract:

What, if anything, makes death bad for the deceased themselves? Deprivationists hold that death is bad for the deceased iff it deprives them of intrinsic goods they would have enjoyed had they lived longer. This view faces the problem that birth too seems to deprive one of goods one would have enjoyed had one been born earlier, so that it too should be bad for one. There are two main approaches to the problem. In this paper, I explore the second approach, by Anthony Brueckner and John Martin Fischer, and suggest that it can be developed so as to meet deprivationists’ needs. On the resulting view, metaphysical differences between the future and the past give rise to a corresponding axiological difference in the intrinsic value of future and past experiences. As experiences move into the past, they lose their intrinsic value for the person.

Copyright

References

Hide All
Belshaw, C. (2000a) ‘Later Death/Earlier Birth’. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 24, 6983.
Belshaw, C. (2000b) ‘Death, Pain and Time’. Philosophical Studies, 97, 317–41.
Bradley, B. (2009) Well-being and Death. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Brink, D. (2011) ‘Prospects for Temporal Neutrality’. In Callender, Craig (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Time (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 353–81.
Brueckner, A., and Fischer, J. M.. (1986) ‘Why is Death Bad?’. Philosophical Studies, 50, 213–21.
Brueckner, A., and Fischer, J. M.. (2013) ‘The Evil of Death and the Lucretian Symmetry: A Reply to Feldman’. Philosophical Studies, 163, 783–89.
Brueckner, A., and Fischer, J. M.. (2014a) ‘Prenatal and Posthumous Existence: A Reply to Johansson’. Journal of Ethics, 18, 19.
Brueckner, A., and Fischer, J. M.. (2014b) ‘Accommodating Counterfactual Attitudes: A Further Reply to Johansson’. Journal of Ethics, 18, 1921.
Brueckner, A., and Fischer, J. M.. (2014c) ‘The Mirror-image Argument: An Additional Reply to Johansson’. Journal of Ethics, 18, 325–30.
Bykvist, K. (2007) ‘Comments on Dennis McKerlie's “Rational Choice, Changes in Values over Time, and Well-being”’. Utilitas, 19, 7377.
Caruso, E. M., Gilbert, D. T., and Wilson, T. D.. (2008) ‘A Wrinkle in Time: Asymmetric Valuation of Past and Future Events’. Psychological Science, 19, 796801.
Casati, R., and Torrengo, G.. (2011) ‘The Not so Incredible Shrinking Future’. Analysis, 71, 240–44.
Feldman, F. (1991) ‘Some Puzzles about the Evil of Death’. Philosophical Review, 100, 205–27.
Feldman, F. (2013) ‘Brueckner and Fischer on the Evil of Death’. Philosophical Studies, 162, 309–17.
Fischer, J. M. (2006) ‘Earlier Birth and Later Death: Symmetry through Thick and Thin’. In McDaniel, Kris, Raibley, Jason, Feldman, Richard, and Zimmerman, Michael (eds.), The Good, the Right, Life and Death (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing). Reprinted in John Martin Fischer (2009), Our Stories: Essays on Life, Death and Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Johansson, J. (2005) Mortal Beings: On the Metaphysics and Value of Death. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International.
Johansson, J. (2008) ‘Kaufman's Response to Lucretius’. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 89, 470–85.
Johansson, J. (2013) ‘Past and Future Nonexistence’. Journal of Ethics, 17, 5164.
Johansson, J. (2014a) ‘Actual and Counterfactual Attitudes: Reply to Brueckner and Fischer’. Journal of Ethics, 18, 1118.
Johansson, J. (2014b) ‘More on the Mirror: Reply to Brueckner and Fischer’. Journal of Ethics, 18, 341–51.
Kagan, S. (1998) ‘Rethinking Intrinsic Value’. Journal of Ethics, 2, 277–97.
Kaufman, F. (1996) ‘Death and Deprivation; Or, Why Lucretius's Symmetry Argument Fails’. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74, 305–12.
Le Poidevin, R. (1996) Arguing for Atheism. New York: Routledge.
Maclaurin, J., and Dyke, H.. (2002) ‘“Thank Goodness That's Over”: The Evolutionary Story’. Ratio, 15, 276–92.
Moore, G. E. (1922) Philosophical Studies. London: Routledge.
Olson, E. (2013) ‘The Epicurean View of Death’. Journal of Ethics, 17, 6578.
Parfit, D. (1984) Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Prior, A. (1959) ‘Thank Goodness that's Over’. Philosophy, 34, 1217.
Sider, T. (2011) Writing the Book of the World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Silverstein, H. (2000) ‘The Evil of Death Re-visited’. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 24, 116–34.
Smuts, A. (2012) ‘Less Good but not Bad: In Defense of Epicureanism about Death’. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 93, 197227.
Suhler, C., and Callender, C.. (2012) ‘Thank Goodness that Argument is Over: Explaining the Temporal Value Asymmetry’. Philosophers’ Imprint, 12, 116.
Sullivan, M. (2012) ‘The Minimal A-theory’. Philosophical Studies, 158, 149–74.
Warren, J. (2004) Facing Death: Epicurus and His Critics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Recommend this journal

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.

Journal of the American Philosophical Association
  • ISSN: 2053-4477
  • EISSN: 2053-4485
  • URL: /core/journals/journal-of-the-american-philosophical-association
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to? *
×

Keywords

Metrics

Altmetric attention score

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 0
Total number of PDF views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

Abstract views

Total abstract views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between <date>. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

Usage data cannot currently be displayed