In 1909, moving freight by rail cost seven to ten times more than by water. Yet despite crowded terminals and a severe shortage of rolling stock, railroads carried eight times more freight by weight than ships and barges, and canal tonnage had fallen by two-thirds since 1880. The railroads, according to President Theodore Roosevelt, were “no longer able to move crops and manufactures rapidly enough to secure the prompt transaction of the business of the Nation.…There appears to be but one complete remedy–the development of a complementary system of transportation by water.” Perishable foods and high-value factory goods would always travel by rail, Roosevelt acknowledged, but bulky cargo such as wheat, coal, timber, and iron could and should move by water. Improving the nation's waterways would increase the profits of railroads and manufacturers, provide capital for expansion, and reduce the cost of living. It would serve as a tonic to the entire economy.

Policymakers transfer knowledge about policies, ideas, and institutions between political systems, learning from one another in a process of policy learning; lesson drawing; diffusion; or policy transfer. As Dolowitz and Marsh observe: “While terminology and focus often vary … studies are concerned with the process by which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions, and ideas in one political system (past or present) are used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political system.” The literature on policy transfer has mainly addressed how policymakers glean potential lessons and use those experiences to devise reforms. It asks questions about why policy transfer occurs; who was involved; what was transferred; from where; the extent of the transfer; and how the process of transfer is “related to policy ‘success’ or ‘failure.’” Greener distinguishes this from policy learning, where policymakers make deliberate adjustments in response to experience or new information, and learning is evident when policy changes as a result of this process. Some scholars see policy transfer as a subset of policy learning, since these are often part of the same procedure. Oliver and Pemberton advance a model, for example, of how ideas are absorbed through learning, in which bureaucratic battles ensue to institutionalize a new policy, and reformers' success in securing support can be critical in determining the extent of policy learning and transfer.

On August 13, 1953, Dwight Eisenhower signed Executive Order 10479 establishing the President's Committee on Government Contracts (PCGC). Designed to oversee federal agencies' efforts to ensure nondiscrimination in firms with government contracts, the committee could receive complaints of discrimination, conduct educational campaigns, make recommendations to agencies on how to combat discrimination, receive agency enforcement reports, and establish ties with private and public organizations working on equal employment issues. Enforcement powers, including the authority to cancel contracts, would remain with individual agencies. Eisenhower designated Vice President Richard Nixon to head the committee, which consisted of six individuals from agencies awarding the largest contracts and nine representatives from business, labor, and civic groups. A small full-time staff would implement policies set by these members.