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Guerrillas and the State: The Role of the State in the Colombian Peace Process

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 February 2009

Lawrence Boudon
Lawrence Boudon
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia.
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Abstract

This article examines the Colombian peace process since 1982, arguing that the government must strengthen the state and expand its presence into the remote areas in which the leftist guerrillas have established para-statal organisations. The traditionally weak Colombian state has allowed rebel groups to flourish in isolated areas. However, President Ernesto Samper has announced a new initiative that features an ambitious plan to strengthen the state. The plan includes judicial and social reforms that address many of the guerrilla demands, but also threaten to undermine their para-statal organisations. Massive oil discoveries and tax reforms could provide the necessary funding.

Type
Articles
Information
Journal of Latin American Studies , Volume 28 , Issue 2 , May 1996 , pp. 279 - 297
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1996

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References

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