Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 March 2024
We examine compensation for endowment Chief Investment Officers (CIOs) overseeing portfolios with significant allocations to alternatives. We find widespread use of bonuses and that large endowments with high alternative allocations hire CIOs with stronger backgrounds, pay them more, and have higher pay-for-performance sensitivity. We find weak evidence of a relationship between compensation and future performance. Our results align with contract theory predictions but differ from empirical findings on pension funds. Endowments pay CIOs more, rely more on bonuses, attract more experienced professionals, and have lower turnover than pensions. This suggests more effective talent management compared to politically influenced public pensions.
We thank Brad Barber, Hendrik Bessembinder (the editor), Justin Birru, Greg Brown, Yong Chen, Nathan Dong, Jonathan Fluharty, Thomas Gilbert, Juan-Pedro Gómez, Amit Goyal, Jillian Grennan, Fotis Grigoris, Umit Gurun, Victoria Ivashina, Steven Kaplan, Aymen Karoui, Josh Lerner, Francis Longstaff, Stefano Pegoraro, Philipp Schnabl, Stephan Siegel, Yuehua Tang (the referee), Jay Wang, and conference participants at the 2022 Eastern Finance Association, the 33rd Australasian Finance and Banking Conference (AFBC), the 2020 Financial Management Association, the 2020 Southern Finance Association, and Korea University Business School for helpful comments and suggestions. Du Nguyen and Kyle Zimmerschied provided excellent research assistance. A previous version of the article circulated under the title “What Drives Pay for Chief Investment Officers At Endowments?” All errors are our own.