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Antitakeover Provisions and Shareholder Wealth: A Survey of the Literature

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 September 2014

Miroslava Straska  and
H. Gregory Waller
Miroslava Straska
Affiliation:
mstraska@vcu.edu, School of Business, Virginia Commonwealth University, 301 W Main St, Richmond, VA 23220.
H. Gregory Waller
Affiliation:
hgwaller@vcu.edu, School of Business, Virginia Commonwealth University, 301 W Main St, Richmond, VA 23220.
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Abstract

We survey theoretical and empirical research on antitakeover provisions, focusing on the relation between antitakeover provisions and shareholder value. We divide the empirical studies based upon the evidence that they provide: short-term event studies, studies on performance and policy changes around adopting antitakeover provisions or passing state antitakeover laws, studies on the impact of antitakeover provisions on takeovers, studies on the relation between antitakeover provisions and firm characteristics, and long-term studies on the relation between antitakeover provisions and firm performance or policies. We also discuss the place of antitakeover provisions in the current debate about “good governance” practices.

Type
Research Articles
Information
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis , Volume 49 , Issue 4 , August 2014 , pp. 933 - 956
Copyright
Copyright © Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington 2014 

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