The purpose of this article is to analyse the practice regarding reservation clauses within the Council of Europe. In spite of a vast amount of literature on the issue of reservations in general and on reservations to specific treaties in particular, little has been written about the regional practice in Europe and then especially within the framework of the Council of Europe.1 This is quite remarkable since a large number of treaties have been concluded under the auspices of the Council and its Secretary General has the role of their depositary. One of the reasons for this absence of academic work on reservations within the Council of Europe as a whole is probably the lack of well-organised and easily accessible documentation on reservations, declarations and objections regarding the treaties of the Council of Europe.

A growing opinion has appeared in refugee and human rights discourse that the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the European Convention) provides more extensive protection against refoulement than the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (the Refugee Convention). However, uncertainties remain as to whether the protection offered by the 1984 UN Convention against Torture (the Torture Convention) and the 1966 UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the Political Covenant) may substitute, or, rather, reinforce, that of the European Convention. Which of these four instruments offers the greatest protection against a decision of refoulement from a European country? The answer to this question is far from being academic. The rule that an international organ may only be competent to consider an individual petition or communication provided “the same matter is not being examined under another procedure of individual investigation or settlement” is embodied in all three instruments providing a procedure for individual complaints. It is therefore crucial for an asylum-seeker to give his or her best shot first, even if, as rightly pointed out by Liz Heffernan, the Strasbourg organs and the Geneva organs are not in competition.1 This article will review the scope of protection afforded under the three of these treaties which provide an international enforcement mechanism to persons who have sought refugee status in the domestic jurisdiction.

In a seminal 1992 article Thomas Franck postulated the emergence in international law of a right to democratic governance.1 Franck argued that, increasingly, the acceptance of a government by other States turns on whether the government governs with the consent of its people.

In supporting this notion, Franck pointed to events such as the 1991 effort by Haitian military and police authorities to overthrow the elected President of Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Although those authorities exercised complete control over Haiti, the international community condemned the coup leaders, refused to engage in normal diplomatic relations with them or to seat their representatives at international organisations, and instead continued to recognise the exiled President Aristide as representing the legitimate government of Haiti. Severe economic and ultimately military sanctions were imposed on Haiti, and finally, in 1994, the coup leaders were forced to relinquish power. President Aristide then returned to Haiti to complete his term as president.

International sanctions, understood as coercive means imposed by the United Nations, or by States, individually or collectively, against a country responsible for violating fundamental rules of international law, have been extensively analysed in the legal literature.1 A survey of such literature shows that particular emphasis has been put on the nature of sanctions, their status in international law and the very controversial issue of the legality of their adoption either by regional organisations, or by a State motu proprio, unilaterally.

Far from being confined to its most obvious manifestations, such as in the right to be tried within a “reasonable time” guaranteed by Articles 5 and 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, references to the notion of “reasonable” are found in a large variety of primary rules pronounced in both legal instruments and the case law.1

The restoration of the pre-war property fights of displaced persons and refugees is critical to restore the peace.

This is particularly true for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The devastating impact of the war which ravaged Bosnia from 1992 until 1995 has left a third of the housing stock destroyed or otherwise uninhabitable. The systematic practice of ethnic cleansing forced Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs to seek shelter in areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina where their ethnic group was in the majority or to seek refuge abroad.1 More than half the 4.5 million the pre-war population of Bosnia and Herzegovina fled their homes in search of safety during the course of the war. According to recent estimates from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, over 800,000 refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina are still abroad today.2 Within Bosnia and Herzegovina, more than 800,000 people remain displaced from their pre-conflict homes.3

The margin of appreciation doctrine has become a fundamental part of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. It has played a central role in most of the cases decided by that Court, including many of its most significant and controversial, and until recently has been the subject of remarkably little analysis. However, there has been a spate of interest in the doctrine in the last year or so.1 Most of this debate has concerned the details of how the margin of appreciation operates in the context of particular articles of the European Convention on Human Rights. This article's purpose is to look at the wider picture. After an outline of the essential characteristics of the doctrine, I will examine the nature of the margin and its role in adjudication. I will suggest that there are logical flaws in the margin as currently conceived, and that these undermine the quality and coherence of the Court's judgments.

The decision of the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords, given on 24 March 1999,1 confirms, by the impressive vote of 6 to 1, the earlier majority ruling that a former head of state enjoys no immunity in extradition or criminal proceedings brought in the United Kingdom in respect of the international crime of torture.

Article N of the Treaty on European Union (TEU ) called for an intergovernmental conference (IGC) in 1996 to reform the articles of the Treaty for which a revision is provided. Also, it was felt that the institutional question should be addressed before the next wave of enlargement; the institutional structure which was adopted to deal with six member States could hardly be stretched further to include the Eastern European applicant States. A complete re-engineering of the institutional framework was required. Furthermore, the reform of the institutions should tend to increase democracy in the Union.

In the last two years, there has been a dearth of legislative initiatives in the field of company law.1 This may be attributed to several reasons. Whilst the company law harmonisation programme is now largely complete, the principle of subsidiarity has to some extent hampered moves toward further harmonisation. Disagreement still reigns over certain crucial issues such as employee participation in corporate management. Also, in the light of the objective to advance EMU, there has been a shift in the Community's priorities. The search for consensus continues in relation to the proposal for a thirteenth company law directive on take-overs and the proposed European Company Statute, although, currently, the national delegations seem to be closer to agreement in relation to the latter than in relation to the former.2

This area of law is dominated by the drive towards harmonisation, and a considerable body of legislation and case law continues to be generated. The vision is of investment in creativity and innovation, leading to growth and competitiveness of a wide range of European industries. Significant progress—sometimes unexpected—can be recorded in certain areas, but it should also be acknowledged that the scale of the problems precludes easy solutions in others.

The Treaty of Amsterdam, signed on 2 October 1997 and in force since 1 May 1999, will make important changes to the external powers and procedures of the European Union.