As my work has argued previously, European integration enjoys an “administrative, not constitutional” legitimacy. This view is in obvious tension with the deeply-rooted conceptual framework—what we might call the “constitutional, not international” perspective—that has dominated the public-law scholarship of European integration over many decades. Although the alternative presented in my work breaks from that traditional perspective, we should not view it as an all-or-nothing rejection of everything that has come before it. The administrative alternative can be seen, rather, as providing legal-historical micro-foundations for certain theories that also emerged out of the traditional perspective even as they too are in tension with it. I am referring in particular to Joseph Weiler's classic notion of European “equilibrium”—now updated as “constitutional tolerance”—as well as Kalypso Nicolaïdis's more recently developed theory of European “demoi-cracy” on which this article focuses in particular. The central idea behind the “administrative, not constitutional” interpretation—the historical-constructivist principal-agent framework rooted in delegation, as well as the balance demanded between supranational regulatory power and national democratic and constitutional legitimacy— directly complements both theories. The administrative alternative suggests how the relationship between national principals and supranational agents is one of “mediated legitimacy” rather than direct control. It has its origins in the evolution of administrative governance in relation to representative government over the course of the twentieth century (indeed before). By drawing on the normative lessons of that history—notably the need for some form of national oversight as well as enforcement of outer constraints on supranational delegation in order to preserve national democratic and constitutional legitimacy in a recognizable sense—this article serves an additional purpose. It suggests how theories of European equilibrium and demoi-cracy might be translated into concrete legal proposals for a more sustainable form of integration over time—a pressing challenge in the context of the continuing crisis of European integration.

As part of the 2010 EU/IMF economic adjustment program or “bail-out,” the Irish Government was required to undertake billions of euros in cuts to social protection spending over a three-year period. These have been implemented in subsequent budgets, resulting in increased levels of poverty and social exclusion. In light of these impacts on social rights in Ireland and other Member States, this article argues that the outcome of such Union legislative measures should be subject to some degree of rights-based scrutiny. It examines how, in the Hartz IV decision, the German Constitutional Court ruled that an attempt by the German Government to pass legislation that significantly cut a range of social welfare benefits breached the fundamental right to a subsistence minimum under the German Basic Law. Drawing inspiration from the approach of the German Constitutional Court, the article argues that the two elements of the German Basic Law which grounded that decision—the right to human dignity (Article 1(1)) and the social state principle (Article 20(1))—are both present within the Union Treaties as a result of changes occasioned by the Lisbon Treaty. The article advocates that the European Court of Justice should discover such a right within Union law and use it as a tool to analyze the impact of future cuts mandated by Union institutions on the economically disadvantaged.

The lingering European financial crisis continues to threaten the Eurozone and, in the opinion of German Chancellor Angela Merkel, the very survival of the European idea. With this apocalyptic rhetoric, it is easily forgotten that only nine years earlier Europe overcame a predicament that was, at the time, equally described as the most challenging in its history. Two failed referendums in Member States of the European Union (Member States)—namely, in France and the Netherlands—stopped the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (Constitutional Treaty) in its tracks and led to an extended “period of reflection” for Europe's leaders. From this emerged a reboot of the Constitutional Treaty, now dubbed the Treaty of Lisbon, with few substantial changes, but more success throughout the ratification procedures. The final hurdle presented itself in the form of institutionally strong Constitutional Courts (CC) and Tribunals (CT) of the European Member States. Of these, the following were at one time or another seized with complaints against the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty: The Austrian Verfassungsgerichtshof (Austrian CC), the Belgian CC, the Ústavní soud České republiky (Czech CC), the French Conseil Constitutionnel (French CC), the German Bundesverfassungsgericht (German CC), the Hungarian CC, the Latvijas Republikas Satversmes tiesa (Latvian CC), the Polish Trybunał Konstytucyjny (Polish CT), and the Tribunal Constitucional de España (Spanish CT).

The new Constitution and the new Act are changing the status of the Hungarian Constitutional Court by developing the Hungarian constitutional tradition, creating better collaboration between the Constitutional Court and the ordinary judiciary, and establishing an effective instrument for the protection of individual human rights. But the pattern of the Parliament reacting to the rulings of the Constitutional Court with constitutional amendments reduces the competences of the Constitutional Court. It is to be hoped that this process is coming to an end, because otherwise the achievement of the “paradoxical revolution of law” is endangered.

Due to the former extensive competences in terms of law review and its limited influence on ordinary jurisdiction, the status of the Constitutional Court caused problems. Because of the abstract nature of the procedures, the distance from the ordinary judiciary, and the power dilemma between the Constitutional Court and the Parliament respectively, the Government decided the main stream of its ruling up to 2012.

Now there are some important changes, especially the introduction of a widespread constitutional complaint. The abolition of the actio popularis is justified. The relationships between the state organs seem to be better clarified and adjusted. The European clause of the 1949/1989 Constitution, which was largely retained in the Fundamental Law, contains a fundamental concept, which is that the European Union is founded on strong sovereign Member States. On the other hand, the Fundamental Law strengthens Hungary's ties to Europe by making these an integral part of that law. As the Constitutional Court had not yet really applied the European Clause, it now has the opportunity to put these two concepts into practice and make them mutually compatible by enforcing them at a high level.

The discussions concerning the newest constitutional developments in Hungary mainly have their origin in the power struggle between the constituent majority of the Parliament and the Constitutional Court. It is not clear, however, how long this conflict will continue to be a matter falling solely within the national sovereignty of Hungary. Due to the parliamentary super-majority of the governing parties, the Constitutional Court is losing its power. Hungary is a unitary state; it is an open question whether there is any substitution needed to balance the power of the governing parties. Nevertheless, in spite of the substantial restrictions on reviewing the constitutionality of financial laws and the several amendments of the new Constitution, the Constitutional Court still plays a role in safeguarding democratic checks and balances. Indeed, it can have a positive impact on the European integration of Hungary. It has been granted new competences to guarantee constitutional unity within the Hungarian legal system and to complete the enforcement of individual rights. The Constitutional Court should make better use of its new granted competence to remedy any possible grievance entirely.

During the past decade, economic crime has been in the public focus in Germany like never before. Major cases, such as the embezzlement proceedings against former Deutsche Bank CEO Ackermann—the so-called Mannesmann proceedings—or the corruption incidents within the Siemens group, have shed more light on illegal behavior in the economic sector. These cases revived an interest in economic criminal law that had not been present since the 1980s when the first wave of economic crime regulation after the establishment of economic criminal law as an academic subject and as a central part of criminal policy had passed. This article analyzes the status and development of economic criminal law. First, it will deal with criminological aspects before turning to the forces in economic crime development. Second, it will examine the changes made in substantive, procedural, and soft law. It includes recent developments, such as the privatization of public investigations and the concept of compliance, as a means to prevent and discover criminal behavior.

Kosovo's declaration of independence in 2008 and the United Nation's claim that UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) (“Resolution 1244”) remains in effect have resulted in the unique case of two competing legal systems, both of which claim legitimacy and supremacy in Kosovo. While Kosovar authorities claim to exercise exclusive and sovereign authority over Kosovo based on the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, the UN, acting through the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (“UNMIK”), maintains that Resolution 1244 vests administrative authority over Kosovo in the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (“SRSG”). This conflict is best exemplified in a number of judgments rendered by the Special Chamber of the Supreme Court of Kosovo on Privatization Agency Related Matters (“Special Chamber”) and the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo. The purpose of this Article is to illustrate the problems that have emerged in the process of the creation of a new legal system in Kosovo and the emergence of a new rule of recognition which is reflected in conflicting judgments of the Special Chamber and the Constitutional Court.